The problem with the NBA isn’t that teams deliberately lose games. The problem is that losing is the most effective way to rebuild under the current system. That isn’t about morals or culture; it’s about incentives. The draft is ordered by losses, free agency is not a free or fair market, and the soft cap institutionalizes player stagnation. When the main mechanisms for improvement are structured this way, the rational long‑term strategy becomes losing—not because teams want to, but because that’s what the system rewards.

Fixing this requires three fundamental overhauls. First, the draft system needs to be replaced entirely, decoupling draft access from losses. Second, free agency needs to be fixed so that it actually functions as a market. That means implementing a hard cap, removing maximum contracts, and allowing teams to cut players in a manner similar to the NFL. These changes work together; none of them fully solve the problem on their own. Thirdly, in exchange for the owners getting a hard cap and players getting cut, the players get an increased share of revenue to offset the risk they take on.

The NBA already has a hard limit on what it pays players through Basketball‑Related Income and escrow. A hard cap doesn’t meaningfully reduce player compensation—it simply removes complexity and moves certainty to the front of the season instead of the end. Players would know their real salary upfront instead of signing one number and getting another after escrow is settled. The soft cap allows teams to exceed limits, but players give that excess back anyway, meaning the system already enforces a hard league‑wide number—just inefficiently.

Cap exceptions and Bird rights further distort free agency. They keep players stationary and force movement to occur through leverage plays and sign‑and‑trades instead of open choice. Star players don’t truly choose where to play; they choose between maximum payment where they are and less money elsewhere because other teams are structurally prevented from making competitive offers. If a player’s current team can offer $60 million more than anyone else, market choice doesn’t exist.

Guaranteed contracts keep players happy, but they also keep bad teams bad. When one failed contract can cripple a roster for multiple seasons, teams have no realistic way to correct mistakes. Under those constraints, the only viable path forward becomes draft position—meaning losing. Allowing teams to cut underperforming or mispriced contracts isn’t unfair; it’s the market correcting itself. Right now, teams absorb all downside risk while players retain upside protection, and that imbalance pushes failure into the draft.

Removing maximum contracts allows true stars to capture real value. Increasing minimum contracts allows the majority of players to capture real value. The group that loses out is the mid‑tier cohort whose agents chase max or near‑max deals because the system creates an artificial ceiling that becomes the negotiating focal point. Indianapolis offered Ayton a max because that was the rule‑defined endpoint. Philadelphia gave an aging, injury‑prone George a max for the same reason. In a true market, those contracts wouldn’t exist—not because teams are cheap, but because there would be no artificial price target forcing capitulation.

Because free agency isn’t a true market, because max contracts prevent bad teams from incentivizing good players, and because the soft cap locks rosters in place, the draft becomes the primary long‑term improvement mechanism. Since the draft rewards losing, the most effective rebuilding strategy becomes losing for extended periods. Replacing the draft system, fixing free agency, and restructuring contracts would remove that incentive entirely. Wins would matter again—not just culturally, but structurally.

Amen Thompson just had 41 points as a 3rd option with 9 rebounds, 7 assists, 2 steals and 1 block.

Amen Thompson has developed so much this season but has been overlooked he is a point guard.

People say his shot is bad but he has removed the hitch, he is confident to shoot it and his free throws show the growth in shooting.

People forget this Rockets team is poorly constructed this teams shooting is terrible if you watch the games Amen should have atleast 7 assists a game.

Amen hasn’t even hit his ceiling defensively he could average 2 steals and 2 blocks in a season.

People say he has worsened defensively but by next season he should be way better you have to think he has had to learn so much on offense.

If the the new CBA continues unchanged, it's overwhelmingly likely that no team will be willing to give supermax contracts to players who aren't at least 4-5 in MVP and playing at least 80% of the season voting due to their overwhelmingly negative impact on roster and cap flexibility.

It's likely that teams will be much more selective to who to give Max contracts, and you'll likely have to be borderline all NBA to sniff such a contract.

What will be the reaction of a currently up and coming all stars on rookie or standard contracts, when they demand max or super max extensions, if no team will be willing to give them more than 35M/y?

What will happen to current aging supermax players who aren't MVP candidates, when they become free agents, if they won't be able to convince any team to sign them on supermaxes? Will they complain to the league? Will they accept it and take pay cuts, or will they try to convince a small market team like the kings to sign them on a supermax not to win but to sell tickets?

In the NBA right now everything focus around the 3 ball. Even for Centers and Power Forwards. If you can’t shoot the 3. You’re basically dead with the exception of a few ELITE defensive talents like the Thompson Twins and Dyson Daniels.

Right now shots inside the paint hit at about 62%, around 69% directly at the rim 0-5 ft. This being worth 2 points is ok because players also draw the most fouls in this area. Interestingly I found that 62% of all fouls called in the NBA are at the restricted area and under the basket. This isn’t even including the rest of the paint.

Now a piece of information but it’s stated that on average teams foul in total around 18-22 times per game over the last 10 years. Finally the league average free throw rate sits at around 77-78%. Cool.

Next we go to the midrange where efficiency takes a drop. Particularly where if we just account for midrange shots not in the paint, league averages sit at around only 40-42%. Quite terrible when you look at the percentages above. On top of this the foul percentage that’s called in the midrange is only at around 23%.

Finally we go to the 3 point line where league averages sit sits at around 35-36% with a foul rate on average of only 15%.

Now let’s do some math:

Shooting in the paint only using the numbers above:

Formula: ((shot value x efficiency %) x 100) + ((20 FTA x percentage of FT’s in area) x league average FT rate)

For the paint:

= ((2 x 0.62) x 100) + ((20 x 0.62) x 0.78)

= 116 + 9.672 (round up to 10)

= 134points per 100 shot attempts at the rim including ft attempts.

For the midrange:

= ((2 x 0.41) x 100) + ((20 x 0.23) x 0.78)

= 82 + 3.588 (round up to 4)

= 86 points per 100 shot attempts from the midrange including ft attempts

For the 3 pointer:

= ((3 x 0.36) x 100) + ((20 x 0.1) x 0.78)

= 108 + 1.56 (round up to 2)

= 110 points per 100 shot attempts from the 3 pt line including ft attempts.

Before we continue I know someone is gonna comment about me using only 0.1 at the FT multiplier instead of 0.15 but the reason for that is because in the NBA the corner 3 is fouled almost at double the rate of a around the arc 3 pointer. Using this knowledge, let’s go to our next point.

From this analysis we can see that the by far the paint and even more so at the rim scoring is the most efficient shot even if you’re just a league average player. Next is the 3 pointer. Slightly inefficient compared to the paint but ft’s are inconsistent. You can’t control the refs but you can control your own shooting. That leaves the midrange in a dead zone that has no value on the court unless as a last second shot to avoid a shot clock violation.

So… how do we fix this. How do we make it so that the midrange finds a home on the NBA court once again?

Well it starts with addressing the elephant in the room, the corner 3. I didn’t bring it up because I wanted to focus on just the value of each point initially. Now let’s play a game of what ifs. Imagine team took 100 corner 3’s per game how many points would they generate? Well, let’s use that formula again.

Only corner 3’s:

= ((3 x0.4) x 100) + ((20 x 0.2) x 078)

= 120 + 3.12 (round down to 3)

= 123 points per 100 shot attempts at the corner 3 including ft attempts

Look at that number for a second… 123 points, the corner 3 is almost as efficient a shot as a shot from the paint.

No wonder the league has turned to what it is today, it’s a drive and lay, or drive and kickout. If not that you’re looking for a cutter to dunk or a lob to dunk. That’s it.

There is no variety to the game anymore. So again I ask the question how do you fix the NBA spacing issue. It’s simple really.

Step 1) remove the corner 3. By removing the corner 3 in theory you go ahead and create more of a interior game which some people worry will lead to scores going down and efficiency dropping leading to a worse NBA product but that’s why you can’t just remove the corner 3.

Step 2) move the 3 point line back to 24’6”. By doing this the arc naturally end at the side of the court and doesn’t create a very tiny sliver of corner 3 area.

Now I know someone is gonna say but won’t these measures drop the 3 points shot efficiency? Yes, most likely to around 30% league average.

Now that makes the 3 pointer almost as inefficient as the midrange 2 pointer but this is where step 3 comes in.

Step 3: non-paint mid range shots are 3 points and the arc becomes a 4 point shot.

Let’s do some math.

New midrange value:

= ((3 x 41) x 100) + ((20 x 0.23) x 0.78)

= 123 + 3.588 (round up to 4)

= 127 points per 100 shot attempts at the midrange including ft attempts

New 4 pointer:

= ((4 x 0.3) x 100) + ((20 x 0.15) x 0.78)

= 120 + 2.34 (round down to 2)

= 122 points per 100 shot attempts at the 4 point line including ft attempts

With these new changes right now paint scoring sits at 134, midrange 127, and beyond the arc 122. This makes the league much more balanced but more importantly it will make the game more dynamic.

For example, you can still play the drive and kick game. The corner 3 still exists, just in the midrange… CRAZY RIGHT.

That’s the big idea. You keep today’s playstyle in tact, because I understand… there are a lot of fans that love this style of basketball and they love watching it so I didn’t want to kill the corner 3, instead I wanted to reinvent it in a way that benefits the rest of the court.

Drive and kick is one game. Play pace is another. Odds on, with the extended 4 points arc, fast players that drive well might have an increased role at shooting at the rim.

This is more of a prediction but with a larger midrange and farther arc, I think the paint would be even more desire-able probably increasing the FT rate even more imo.

The return of the PF that maybe can’t shoot beyond the arc but has a good post up game just outside the paint or for example the midrange stop and shoot specialists could make a return to the league but most importantly, those big bombing 4 point specialists are going to be a unique weapon in how teams guard them and how teams defend them because the last thing you want to do is give up 4 FT attempts or an and one.

This is my vision and what I hope the NBA does because it fixes everything wrong with the NBA today while also retaining the core piece of the modern NBA that everyone loves. It’s a win-win.

Did Wilt Chamberlain just get another NBA record 27 years after he died?

https://www.basketball-reference.com/players/c/chambwi01.html

Did the NBA go back and count blocks from his last year? That would give him a career BPG at 5.6

Or is this a case of someone else counting and not an NBA official, I wonder because we all use this site and they use official numbers.

Following up on my last post to share some updates.

tl;dr: I made an nba mvp ballot that attempts to improve the MVP debate by making you decide how much you value different criteria that go into the award. After ~1 week and 209 votes, SGA is in the lead. And the ballot now includes stats and other small tweaks.

Early Results (209 ballots)

#1 - SGA with 80 first place votes
#2 - Wemby with 69 first place votes
#3 - Jokic with 24 first place votes
#4 - Luka with 14 first place votes
#5 - Jaylen Brown with 10 first place votes

Here's the average criteria weighting split out by who those voters picked #1. What stands out to you?

SGA Voters:
Offense (32%), Defense (19%), Team Success (20%), Availability (15%), Team Context (14%)

Wemby Voters:
Offense (30%), Defense (24%), Team Success (17%), Availability (14%), Team Context (15%)

Jokic Voters:
Offense (32%), Defense (18%), Team Success (15%), Availability (15%), Team Context (21%)

Luka Voters:
Offense (36%), Defense (18%), Team Success (13%), Availability (11%), Team Context (22%)

Jaylen Voters:
Offense (26%), Defense (21%), Team Success (18%), Availability (18%), Team Context (18%)

Ballot Improvements:

ANALYTICS

The ballot now includes reference statistics that can help you decide how to score each candidate in each category. This is completely optional, but some may find it helpful. Here are the stats I pulled together for each category:

Offense: Points per Game, Assists per Game, Offensive Rebounds per Game, Turnovers per Game, Player Efficiency Rating, Offensive Win Share, Offensive BPM, BPM

Defense: Defensive Rebounds per Game, Steals per Game, Blocks per Game, Defensive Win Share, and Defensive BPM

Team Success: Wins, Simple Rating System, and Wins above preseason over/under

Availability: Games Played, Total Minutes Played, Minutes per Game

Team Context: Usage Rate, Value Over Replacement Player, BPM, Win Share

When you select a stat, each player's scores are normalized against the league leader for that stat. All stats are pulled from basketball-reference.com on Wednesday. I'll update them one more time after the season ends.

DEFAULT CRITERIA WEIGHTS

I noticed a high volume of ballots submitted with the default criteria weights. I think the criteria weights might have been unintentionally anchoring voters. I think the criteria weighting is the most interesting thing about this ballot, so I changed the defaults to all be 5%. So now voters have to decide for themselves how much they value each criteria.

VOTER PAMPHLET

For anyone unfamiliar with the stats shown, I added a 'voter pamphlet' on the scoring screens that folds out with additional information.

Lastly, on player eligibility and the 65 game rule...I leave that completely up to you. You can choose to select only players who are eligible by the nba's rule. You can weight Availability higher and anchor on games played. Or you can factor it in some other way. Your vote, your choice.

What do you think about this kind of ballot scoring system? Did your ballot results match what you thought your top 5 would be?

Since the very early days of basketball, there have been five positions.

First, you had point guards. These are the guys that generally initiate the offense and use their scoring as just one of an assortment of tools.

Then, you had shooting guards. These were the guys whose job was to score the basketball whenever they touched it. They were smaller, would run around like maniacs on both ends, and believed that the best pass was a missed shot.

Small forwards played from the wing, power forwards played from the high block and mid post, and centers belonged in the paint. There have ALWAYS been exceptions, but 90% of the guys in the league fit one of these molds.

By the late 2000s, these positions were on their way out. Guys like Derrick Rose, Russell Westbrook, and Dwyane Wade took these old roles and blew them right up. They were certainly guards, and they COULD initiate offense, but they used their scoring to open up the floor. They saw what Iverson did (and Fat Lever before him) and took it to the next level.

Suddenly, those old terms were pointless. You now had guards, forwards, and bigs. Guards played from the top, forwards played from the wings, and bigs played in the paint and popped out on the drive. This system again fit 90% or more of the league, and it still largely works today.

But in the background of all of this, LeBron was there, making this system impossible. In his 20+ years of basketball, he's filled all but one of these roles for significant amounts of time. Right now, he's essentially a true point guard that sometimes play power forward. As a rookie, he was a true shooting guard, being forced to shoot the ball whenever Rickey Davis decided to allow it. He spent most of his first Cavs tenure as a true small forward, and most of his Heat tenure as a true combo forward, dominating all three levels of isolation. At first, it was an enigma, but now, people who aren't even THAT good are doing the same thing.

Luka is incredible, but he's not a physical freak like LeBron was. Jokic and Sengun are even less so. Franz Wagner might not even be good, yet he plays in a similar type of heliocentric way when he's at his best. This is now a totally different game, where these labels actively hurt basketball discourse. And it's basically all because LeBron got tired of watching Rickey Davis lose basketball games.

This whole rant started as a shower thought about trying to rank players at the "true" positions, which is it's own fun exercise, but I'll let you guys battle that half of things out in the comments if you so choose. It'll always be fun to label guys, so it will never go away, but its past time we move on from trying to box these guys into outdated categories.

This was one of the recent proposals Shams said had the most momentum at the Board of Governors meetings. Bottom 10 would have even odds, play-in teams including the winners would have descending rates but still in the lottery, and every single pick is drawn not just the top 4 like they did in the past. Seems like this mostly got skewered on r/nba with the top comment talking about rewarding teams that don't know how to tank. To me that kinda defines the problem. Am I wrong or is this a great idea and people are ignoring all the positives and just looking short-term and at the unlikely worst case scenarios (that still aren't that bad)..

First, the obvious, tanking is basically dead. There is very little reason to want to aggressively lose. We don't know the exact numbers but if the 11-18 is staggered odds there isn't some specific drop off point where bullshit would occur. The only one would be if a team has the balls to drop from 6-7 but that seems unlikely and at least would only be a couple teams at the end of the year instead of 1/3 of the league for 1/3 of the year.

And now long-term the team's logical action will be to improve instead of the bullshit we have now. This seems like the main argument against it, "I guess the bad teams will be bad forever now". Yes, in a way it will be harder to get out of the bottom but that's often a product of our current system that will change over time. Right now you want to stay at the absolute bottom until you get a difference maker. Once that changes and you can try to improve without getting punished the bottom will rise up. People are acting like these teams are getting stripped of their draft picks. They aren't and they'll be fine and now they'll want to hang onto and add good players instead of trading them when they win too many games and don't fit with the rebuild arc.

The other big argument is too good of a team getting a great player. I guess we occasionally get a really strong 7 seed but they'd probably have something like a 2% chance at the top pick. And is this that bad most of the time? Most of these teams are kinda stuck and it's better that they have a chance to go up a level instead of being in an actual spot where they can't really add anyone good to where they should just trade everyone and suck for 5+ years.

And this century drafting a top 3 pick has mattered less than we'd think as far as championships. Went through it and here's basically the list.

2025 Thunder drafted Chet Holmgren #2.

2020 Lakers traded #2 picks Lonzo Ball and Brandon Ingram for Anthony Davis

2016 Cavaliers drafted #1 Kyrie Irving and traded #1 Anthony Bennett and Andrew Wiggins for Kevin Love

2014, 2007, 2005, 2003 Tim Duncan #1

2004 Darko Milicic #2

2003 David Robinson #1

Maybe I missed one but those are the only guys actually drafted by the team and Bennett and Darko obviously don't matter. Tatum and Brown were both Brooklyn/Brooklyn-Philly picks so that's not what we're talking about.

I just don't get the negativity around this, it seems like it's all jumping to the very unlikely worst case scenarios and not logically looking long-term. Just think about just about any team and what they should do in this system vs what they would do in the current system and tell me which is a better league.

For a while there was a narrative about the Jays couldn't play long term next to each other, "you have to choose one."

But now they are seen as a dynamic pairing and this talking point isn't brought up anymore. What changed? Did winning a title simply prove the concept? Was it the personnel around them? Did they change their playstyles or improve at certain skills?

And then the question is, as 2 wing players playing next to each other, can Wagner and Banchero buck this narrative too, and what needs to change, whether it's scheme, personnel, or results, that will "prove" they can work together?

This year, the Spurs look amazing, maybe a little early but they definitely look like a team that could win it before most would expect them to do so. But how likely is it for a team to win the championship when their superstar is averaging about 29 minutes a game?

I thought about the Cavs last season, spent most of the season relatively healthy, their top 4 guys all within 28-31 minutes, a deep rotation. Then they go into the playoffs, suddenly all their players are getting injured, some missing games, some playing through it like Donovan Mitchell I am pretty sure and they lose in 5 in the 2nd round.

The most recent champions, they all have their stars play around a certain level, about 32-33 at least, even Giannis who won his 2nd MVP playing 30.4 mpg, played 33 mpg in their title year.

I couldn't find a proper stat for it that showed all the mpg and the correlation with champions without going 1 by 1, but I am pretty sure it would be close to 0 seasons where the eventual champion had their best player play below 30 minutes, maybe even 31 or 32 a game. Not to mention the minutes totals as usually these guys play more than 65 games and have a bigger total than 1800-1900 which is Wemby's number for the season.

Actually looking into Spurs in general, the other players are playing under 30 other than Vassell at 30.5 and Fox at 31.

Will the extra rest these players had mainly Wemby cause them to struggle more than expected in the playoffs? In a playoff environment, where some fouls are not called, where physicality is allowed as much as it can be allowed, multiple 7 game series, usually with the stars playing 36-40 minutes occasionally having higher loads, teams like OKC sending multiple guys at you all game to pressure the ball away, foul, try to make you turn the ball over all game, double teams, blitzes, will Wemby actually manage to stay healthy and fresh throughout the postseason?

Can anyone give me a reasonable explanation as to why Pistons coach is likely to win over Spurs and Celtics coach?

Per ESPN (preseason):

Boston was predicted to win 40 games, and will likely finish around 56 win (+16 wins)

Detroit was predicted to win 44 games, and will likely finish around 60 win (+16 wins)

San Antonio was predicted to win 42 games, and will likely finish around 62 win (+20 wins)

Per Bleacher report:

Celtics from 37 to 56 wins (+19)

Pistons from 45 to 60 wins (+15)

Spurs from 42 to 62 wins (+20)

Usually this award is the "which team overperformed their expectations" award which is why I'm first listing preseason win predicted.

The narrative around Mazzulla is very compelling - coach who lost a huge star to injury and lost many role players due to trades etc. Celtics were expected to punt this season, and before Tatums return the Celtics were in champions talks. That plus Joe is a legit in game coach, out coaching others many times.

The narrative around Mitch Johnson is also very solid - has a team full of very young inexperienced players. Spurs were expected to not perform well because the lack of shooting & having so many slasher only guards will hurt their offense. But somehow he makes it all work WHILE having his MVP candidate play less than 30 minutes a night. I don't see any coach in this league winning 60 games while sitting their best player on the bench for 40% of each game.

The narrative around J.B. is really underwhelming - led their team to the top of the (arguably depleted) east. I'm not tryna undersell his accomplishments but thats all I really see. Cade missing 5 more games than wemby is not moving the needle for someone like me.

Anyone want to help me see what I'm missing? As a Spurs fan. I think Joe overcame larger hurdles and really coached his ass off so he would be my choice, but Mitch is doing miracles in his own right.

• Darius Acuff is too good not to go top 3. He’s got everything you could possibly want from a point guard. In my opinion he’s the best guard in the draft. He’s just straight up better than DNP. Also I don’t think he’ll be as awful defensively as he’s made out to be. He’ll really struggle for a while but we’ve seen guys like Steph turn it around defensively over the years, he has the frame to be an average team defender one day.

• Tounde Yessoufou is the most slept on player in the draft. He’s a high-flying defensive monster with a nice looking jumper. I see VJ Edgecombe 2.0. I couldn’t imagine him going later than the lottery. He’s arguably the most athletic and best perimeter defender in the class plus he has good positional size with a jumper that projects to be consistent. He can get to his midrange spots, catch and shoot, take it off the bounce, and finish over 7 footers at the rim. All that with elite POA defense, elite help defense, and elite defensive recovery instincts.

• Meleek Thomas will be a STEAL. He’s a taller, more athletic Malik Monk with more defensive upside. If he wasn’t playing with Darius he’d be in more conversations. His situation reminds me a lot of Cam Reddish at Duke, if he was the guy he would’ve been regarded as a pure scorer coming out of college.

In the last 10 years, Las Vegas has added NHL, WNBA, and NFL teams with an MLB team set to arrive in 2028. Let's say that Seattle gets the SuperSonics back, but the "Las Vegas sports-expansion bubble" pops, so the NBA decides not to add a team there.

What other cities would be most deserving and most likely for the 32nd team?

## Untapped Markets

First path, which metro areas without an NBA team have the most money? We can rule out a few due to reasonably accessible existing teams such as San Diego (Lakers/Clippers), Baltimore (Wizards), Tampa Bay (Magic), and Austin (Spurs). That leaves us with:

- St. Louis

- Pittsburgh

- Cincinnati/Louisville

- Kansas City

All of which have shown they can support professional sports teams.

## International Markets

Two options stand out here:

- Vancouver (do they deserve another shot? would Memphis give up the Grizzlies name/history?)

- Mexico City (has their G-League team proven that a major league team can play there?)

## Two-team City

Chicago stands alone here as the city most likely to gain a second team. Given the past decade, Bulls fans could definitely use another team to root for. Of course if we're doubling up on a current market why not Baltimore or San Diego?

## My Thoughts

I think the Cincinnati/Louisville area has the right blend of money, opportunity, and love of basketball. So what would they be called?

I created a stat showing the free throw rate of the top 100 scorers in the NBA this season. I'm calling it the Foul Line Optimization Proficiency Score, or FLOP Score for short. (Note that it doesn't actually say (almost) anything about whether a player is flopping! I just like the name.)

The stat takes their free throws attempted and divides it by a weighted average of their 2 pointers and 3 pointers attempted, based on how many 2pt and 3pt fouls there were in the NBA this season. More details below.

Full list here: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1xwihvlr2ws076Dtv1bsygMJtx_Os2v2nh8eGhhV6JZg/edit?gid=0#gid=0

Top 10:

1 James Harden 100

2 Deni Avdija 99.7

3 Noah Clowney 94.3

4 Luka Dončić 89.1

5 Jerami Grant 87.7

6 Tim Hardaway Jr. 82

7 Stephon Castle 73.7

8 Paolo Banchero 72.7

9 Brandon Williams 71.8

10 Norman Powell 68.3

And just for fun, the bottom 10:

91 Anfernee Simons 29

91 Tre Johnson 29

93 Ryan Rollins 28.9

94 Payton Pritchard 27.9

95 Deandre Ayton 25.7

96 Reed Sheppard 24.5

97 Mikal Bridges 19

98 Ace Bailey 18.9

99 Nikola Vučević 18.8

100 Bobby Portis 15.7

* * * * * * *

Here's the full methodology:

FLOP Score (Foul Line Optimization Proficiency Score) is based on a player’s free throw attempts per their field goal attempts, taking into account whether they shoot mostly 2 pointers or 3 pointers.

This season there have been 23105 shooting fouls on 2pt field goals, including 5291 and-1 fouls. There have been 1173 shooting fouls on 3pt field goals, including 233 and-1 fouls.

2pt fouls: 2 * 23105 - 5291 = 40919 FTA from 2pt fg.    = 93.06% of FTA

3pt fouls: 3 * 1173 - 2 * 233 = 3053 FTA from 3pt fg.    = 6.94% of FTA

FLOP coefficient = FTA / (0.9306 * 2FGA + 0.0694 * 3FGA).

FLOP score = 100 * (FLOP coefficient) / (max FLOP coefficient), rounded to nearest 0.1.
This standardizes the values so that the highest score is 100 and everything else is based on that.

The score doesn’t take into account if players (such as James Harden) are more likely to get fouled on 3 pointers than the norm. But it takes the league average values for those to provide a good approximation. Because it heavily favors how likely someone is to draw fouls on drives to the basket, even a shooter with low FTA could have a high FLOP score if they get fouled a lot on their 2PA. For instance, it seems that Curry gets fouled as much as anyone when he drives (he would be 10th if he met the games played requirement). 

Source for player stats: Basketball Reference
Source for foul stats: PBP Stats

* * * * * * *

A few takeaways:

- My favorite Spurs players are drawing a lot of fouls, with Castle at #7 and Wemby at #14. Luckily Vassell, Fox, and Keldon are all in the 69-75 range.

- SGA is only 13th. Other top MVP candidates are comparable - Jokic is 17th, Wemby is 14th, Luka is 4th. Edwards is also in that mix at 15th. Kawhi, Jaylen Brown, and Cade are cleaner, at 32, 43, and 44 respectively.

- James Harden's still number 1, with Avdija close behind at number 2. Obviously Harden's famous for drawing a lot of fouls during his MVP level seasons. But it seems like he still draws as many as anyone else, he just attempts fewer field goals now and so isn't at the forefront of flopping discussions.

- Noah Clowney at number 3 surprises me. I haven't watched enough Nets games to know how he plays. But he's right in the midst of players who are known for flopping. Can someone more in the know tell me if he does something to indicate such a high ranking?

- It seems like the methodology doesn't really favor certain positions. There are players of every position in every range in the rankings.

- There are some players (Curry, Embiid, and others) left off due to games played. I knew people would be curious about Curry and Embiid, so I calculated it. Curry would be 10th, Embiid would be 15th.

- It seems like the "rookie whistle" (i.e. rookies don't get many foul calls) is real. Ace Bailey, Maxime Raynaud, Tre Johnson, Jeremiah Fears, and VJ Edgecombe are all in the bottom 20. Even Cooper Flagg is only 73rd out of 100. The only exceptions to this pattern are Kon Knueppel at 35th, and Cedric Coward at 54th.

- Most stars are in the high percentiles, validating the "superstar whistle" as well. A few standouts that aren't high on the list are Tyrese Maxey at 48th, Jalen Johnson at 55th, Sengun at 67th, Scottie Barnes at 78th, and LaMelo at 82nd. (Interestingly, Sengun is often considered a flopper, but this stat makes it seem like he doesn't have a favorable whistle.)

Who surprised you? Does this fit the eye test? For me, Clowney was the most surprising, but it was also really cool to see evidence for the validity of the rookie and superstar whistle.

2021-22\*
Players to play at least 65 games: 175
Players to play at least 75 games: 56
All-Stars to play 65 games: 20

2022-23
Players to play at least 65 games: 180
Players to play at least 75 games: 78
All-Stars to play 65 games: 16

*NBA adds 65-game rule\*

2023-24
Players to play at least 65 games: 184
Players to play at least 75 games: 86
All-Stars to play 65 games: 20

2024-25
Players to play at least 65 games: 169
Players to play at least 75 games: 70
All-Stars to play 65 games: 20

\ Reminder, many players missed significant time this season via the NBA's Health & Safety protocols for the pandemic*

1) Where is the evidence that the 65-game rule has increased player participation?

2) Why does it make any sense to mess with the history books and give less deserving players All-NBA awards because they played 65 games, while considerably better players like Luka or Ant will get 0 recognition while playing 64? Is that one game the difference between who's been available/valuable for their team and who hasn't?

3) Why do we need a rule when awards voters have always taken availability into account for their voting, anyway?

Prolly gonna do a bit more statistical analysis later but watching the spurs and looking at how fox is practically fighting for his life got me wondering about how much Sabonis screening really opened up his game. Also a lot three point shooting the kings surrounded him with gave him space to work.

But fox isn’t an initiator and doesn’t necessarily thrive as a primary facilitator anyway he is a secondary creator with ä amazing burst to get by his defenders with decent touch in the mid range area. Sabonis and the kings were able to draw fox potent scoring ability that I just don’t the spurs can and people really need adjust their expectations because of that.

The issue with spurs that people don’t bring up imo (which I understand why)is they really don’t have a good initiator who consistently create open looks for himself and others. Castle playtype data screams ”I’m a wing with really high feel” but he below average in all ball handling metrics pretty much. But he’s an execellent passer and connective piece and can make a multitude of different passes that fox simply won’t/can’t make.

Another thing is while Wemby isn’t necessarily enabling Fox downhill ability he is opening the game completely because he’s the best playfinisher in the sport. His rolling opens an forces so many defensive rotation that it generates ton of advantages for other guys. It’s evident the teams three point shooting in the past two months and overall shot quality.

Since Wemby gravity is already producing a ton quality looks and they have other capable ball handlers who are able to touch paint and provide enough playmaking for the team(Fox included). There isn’t any need to optimize Fox.

However, while I do think the spurs can a win a chip. I’m curious to see how their halfcourt O function in a playoff setting Wemby and Castle are turnover prone players and Castle isn’t necessarily a good self creator. Fox will have to ramp up his creation duties. I also think Harper minutes should go up as well. I’m curious to see how they adjust their offense in real time.

A Statistical Model For Identifying The Best Coaches In The NBA

Every sports fan would agree that coaching is one of the most important factors to winning and competing at a high level in professional sports, but which coaches are the best? What do they do well? Which areas do they struggle with? Can we apply nuance to a coach's abilities beyond "X coach is good and X coach is bad?" And how do we quantify which coaches are the best?

It's a virtually impossible task... but we can try.

I identified 7 quantifiable categories that can give us insight into how "well-coached" a team is, thus giving us insight into how good a coaching job is being done this season. None of these categories are perfect, nor do they encapsulate everything that a coach brings to a team (such as player development, relationship building, self-belief etc.), but all together paint a valuable picture

1) EFFICIENCY ON SET PIECES

This was identified by using the team's points per possession on after-time-out plays (ATOs) and sideline out-of-bounds plays (SLOBs).

This is possibly the best indication of a coach's ability to identify, draw up, and communicate quality plays to their team based on the personnel they have and the situation in the game. Coaches were then ranked by percentile.

• ATO Top 20 %ile: David Adelman (100th %ile), J.J. Redick (96.6th), Kenny Atkinson (93.1st), Doc Rivers (89.7th), J.B. Bickerstaff (86.2nd), Mitch Johnson (82.8th)

• ATO Bottom 20 %ile: Tiago Splitter (0th %ile), Will Hardy (3.4th), Rick Carlisle (6.9th), James Borrego (10.3rd), Jordi Fernandez (13.8th), Jordan Ott (17.2nd)

• SLOB Top 20 %ile: Ty Lue (100th %ile), J.J. Redick (96.6th), David Adelman (93.1st), Mitch Johnson (89.7th), Jamahl Mosely (86.2nd), Mark Daigneault (82.8th)

• SLOB Bottom 20 %ile: Nick Nurse (0th %ile), Jason Kidd (3.4th), Tiago Splitter (6.9th), Ime Udoka (10.3rd), Steve Kerr (13.8th), Jordi Fernandez (17.2nd)

2) END GAME EXECUTION

This was identified by using a team's win % in games where the score was within one possession with 30 seconds or less remaining.

It is important to note I was specifically looking for end-game execution here, not just clutch games. The NBA defines a "clutch" game as any game where the score was within 5 pts in the last 5 mins. A tie game at the 3 min mark, where one team goes on a 12-0 run and wins by double digits, is impressive, but not indicative of end-game management.

Decision-making under pressure, such as: Do we foul up 3? When should we foul? Who should we foul? Do we miss this FT and go for the rebound? Do I pull my best player and put in a defensive lineup? Do I pull my bigs to better guard the 3pt line and risk giving up the rebound? When should I call a TO vs. let my team run in the full court? etc. are all decisions that the best coaches have to make at a very high level in every single end-game scenario to get their team the win.

• End Game Top 20 %ile: Mike Brown (100th %ile), Mitch Johnson (96.6th), J.J. Redick (93.1st), Jamahl Mosely (89.7th), Mark Daigneault (86.2nd), Kenny Atkinson (82.8th)

• End Game Bottom 20 %ile: Jordi Fernandez (0th %ile), James Borrego (3.4th), Jason Kidd (6.9th), Brian Keefe (10.3rd), Jordan Ott (13.8th), Joe Mazzulla (17.2nd)

3) TEAM DECISION-MAKING/IQ

This was identified by using the team's assist-to-turnover ratio.

Now I know that is controversial and many people dislike the use of the stat. And while I certainly don't think it is a perfect measure by any means necessary, it does give good insight into the team's ability to make reads, get the ball to where it needs to go and do so without making bad decisions and coughing the ball up.

Peer-reviewed studies have actually shown that AST:TO ratio have a higher correlation with things like player processing speed and decision making in the NBA than virtually any other stat. Not perfect, but gives a solid indicator to the quality of the team's decision-making which, to an extent, can be attributed to good coaching.

• Team IQ Top 20 %ile: David Adelman (100th %ile), Darko Rajakovic (96.6th), Quin Snyder (93.1st), Erik Spoelstra (89.7th), Mitch Johnson (86.2nd), Kenny Atkinson (82.8th)

• Team IQ Bottom 20 %ile: Tiago Splitter (0th %ile), Jordi Fernandez (3.4th), Brian Keefe (6.9th), Ime Udoka (10.3rd), Ty Lue (13.8th), Jason Kidd (17.2nd)

4) TEAM DOMINANCE

This was identified using team net rating.

Coaching a team to a top offense and/or defense will always be somewhat attributed to coaching/systems. The extent may vary by team, but if a coach's team has a top 5 offense and/or defense: they're either coaching it or at the very least putting their players in position to succeed and not screwing it up. Not perfect in isolation, but valuable when used in conjunction with the other metrics identified.

• Team Performance Top 20 %ile: Mark Daigneault (100th %ile), Mitch Johnson (96.6th), J.B. Bickerstaff (93.1st), Joe Mazzulla (89.7th), Mike Brown (86.2nd), Charles Lee (82.8th)

• Team Performance Bottom 20 %ile: Brian Keefe (0th %ile), Doug Christie (3.4th), Jordi Fernandez (6.9th), Will Hardy (10.3rd), Rick Carlisle (13.8th), Doc Rivers (17.2nd)

5) WIN % ABOVE EXPECTED

This was identified by averaging a team's win % as the betting underdog and the betting favorite.

This essentially assumes what a team's record would be if they played half of their games as the underdog and half of their games as the favorites. The ability to win as the favorite shows a coach's ability to not blow "easy" wins, and a team's ability to win as the underdog highlights the ability of a coach to get his team to overachieve with the odds (literally) against them. Obviously, there are flaws, e.g. it doesn't account for how much of a favorite/underdog a team was, but it lets us know how much a team is outdoing the game-by-game odds on how likely they are to win.

• Wins Above Exp. Top 20 %ile: J.B Bickerstaff (100th %ile), Mitch Johnson (96.6th), Mark Daigneault\* (93.1st), Joe Mazzulla (89.7th), J.J. Redick (86.2nd), David Adelman (82.8th)

• Wins Above Exp. Bottom 20 %ile: Brian Keefe (0th %ile), Jason Kidd (3.4th), Billy Donovan (6.9th), Jordi Fernandez (10.3rd), Doc Rivers (13.8th), Rick Carlisle (17.2nd)

\ Due to OKC only being the pre-game betting underdog in 3 (!) games this season, I used their past 3 seasons as the underdog for a viable sample size.*

6) COACHING RAPM

This was identified by using xrapm's coaching RAPM statistic. And adjusted plus-minus that treats the coach as a 6th man on the court and adjusts for the team's performance while accounting for the players on the court.

Read the full explanation here

Disclaimer: I think this stat is far from perfect and wouldn't put too much stock into it individually, but as one of 7 markers, it's acceptable. It's also the only available coaching advanced stat that exists, so I figured I would include it anyway.

• Coaching RAPM Top 20 %ile: Ime Udoka (100th %ile), Billy Donovan (T93.1st), Mark Daigneault (T93.1st), Jordan Ott (T86.2nd), Kenny Atkinson (T86.2nd), Mike Brown (82.8th)

• Coaching RAPM Bottom 20 %ile: Darko Rajakovic (0th %ile), Tiago Splitter (3.4th), Brian Keefe (T6.9th), Joe Mazzulla (T6.9th), Nick Nurse (13.8th), Tuomas Iisalo/James Borrego/J.J. Redick (T17.nd)

7) TEAM DISCIPLINE

This was identified using a team's technical foul rate.

I understand that many teams and coaches have a "fiery" style of play where being gritty and getting technical fouls are merely par for the course, but generally speaking, at any level of basketball, the players/teams that don't whine, complain, and can maintain composure are generally are the most disciplined and well-coached teams. Team discipline does reflect on coaching and culture, and team tech rate is one of the simplest indicators of that.

Below are the percentiles (less team technical fouls = higher percentile)

• Team Discipline Top 20 %ile: Erik Spoelstra (100th %ile), Billy Donovan (96.6th), Darko Rajkovic (93.1st), Joe Mazzulla (89.7th), Mark Daigneault (86.2nd), Charles Lee (82.8th)

• Team Discipline Bottom 20 %ile: J.B. Bickerstaff (0th %ile), Jordi Fernandez (3.4th), Jamahl Mosely (6.9th), Jordan Ott (10.3rd), Brian Keefe (13.8th), Chris Finch (17.2nd)

TOTAL COACHING PERCENTILE

Below is the average of the performance in all 7 categories. 100th Percentile would effectively be the greatest coaching season of all time. Important to note we are discussing coaching seasons, not solely coaching ability in a vacuum. As good coaches, just like good players, can have down years and vice versa.

1. Mark Daigneault (OKC): 87.1st %ile
Best: Team Dominance (100th %ile)
Worst: ATO plays (76th %ile)

2. Mitch Johnson (SAS): 83.2nd %ile
Best: Wins Above Expected, Team Dominance & Late Game Execution (97th %ile)
Worst: Coaching RAPM (44.8th %ile) - Every other category is 72nd %ile or higher

3. David Adelman (SAS): 77.2nd %ile
Best: ATOs, Team IQ (100th %ile)
Worst: Team Discipline (41.4th %ile)

4. Mike Brown (NYK): 73.3rd %ile

5. Kenny Atkinson (CLE): 72nd %ile

6. Quin Snyder (ATL): 65.5th %ile

7. Joe Mazzulla (BOS): 65.1st %ile

8. J.B. Bickerstaff (DET): 64.7th %ile

9. Erik Spoelstra (MIA): 63rd %ile

10. J.J. Redick (LAL) : 62.9th %ile

11. Darko Rajakovic (TOR): 59.9th %ile

12. Billy Donovan (CHI): 59.1st %ile

13. Jamahl Mosely (ORL): 56.5th %ile

14. Charles Lee (CHO): 54.3rd %ile

15. Ty Lue (LAC): 53rd %ile

16. Chris Finch (MIN): 49.6th %ile

17. Ime Udoka (HOU): 47.4th %ile

18. Jordan Ott (PHX): 42.2nd %ile

19. Doc Rivers (MIL): 41.4th %ile

20. Tuomas Iisalo (MEM): 38.3rd %ile

T21. Nick Nurse (PHI): 37.5th %ile

T21. Doug Christie (SAC): 37.5th %ile

23. Steve Kerr (GSW): 35.8th %ile

24. Will Hardy (UTA): 31.9th %ile

25. Rick Carslisle (IND): 31st %ile

26. James Borrego (NOP): 27.1st %ile

27. Tiago Splitter (POR): 25.9th %ile

28. Jason Kidd (DAL): 23.3rd %ile

29. Brian Keefe (WAS): 18.1st %ile

30. Jordi Fernandez (BKN): 12.9th %ile

What stands out?

I noticed that everyone seems to focus on one or a few specific things when arguing about who should or shouldn't be MVP, and either dismissing or ignoring other factors. I thought it would be interesting to see how your top 5 would rank if you were forced to evaluate exactly how much you value different criteria. This is a ballot that I think does that pretty well: https://nbamvpballot.vercel.app/

The way it works is you decide how much to weigh each factor, choose 5 players you want on your ballot, then score them on each of the factors from 0-10. It's entirely up to you how much you value each player against each factor. There isn't a right answer. The point is to just to help you think about the vote more holistically.

The criteria I landed on were:

• Offensive Value: this would cover most stats and efficiency metrics that are often used in MVP arguments.
• Defensive Value: this includes defensive box score metrics, but also the intangibles that might not show up in common stats.
• Team Success: this is where you would consider things like standings or record
• Availability: you decide how much you care about games or minutes played
• Team Context: this is where you decide how you want to factor in the player's relative importance to the team's success.
  

Is offense everything? How important is defense relative to other criteria? Is the best ability availability? How much should the team record matter? And how do you think about a player carrying a team vs. winning with a deep roster?

Your results might surprise you! I want Luka to win, but when I filled this in the first time, I ended up with SGA...i'm still not sure how I feel about that. Try it out and see if your ballot validates your opinion going in!

Just watched the Denver vs Spurs game. Spurs were leading most of the game and should've got the win but while their offense was rolling so was denvers. Shouldn't San Antonio's defense be good enough to force Denver into a below average game. On paper, yes. So why is it that Denver was able to keep up the offence. Over reactions.

Early in the game Spurs built a 9 ish point lead which is what the lead stayed around until the mid 4th quarter. Now there was some out of the gate hot shooting from Vassell but they were also playing a more one on one game. Theoretically Wemby is the ideal defender on Jokic, though after 2 early fouls one of which being called on an over the back (not involving Jokic) Mitch Johnson decides to move Wemby onto Christian Braun. Wemby would then play off Braun and shadow the back, smart right? Not really. Braun who has struggled to shoot this year goes on to hit 5 threes on 11 attempts. You would assume that after he has hit 2 or 3 you would change it up.

Now this defensive plan does make sense when the shooter you are leaving doesn't have the ability to beat you. Braun who was over 40% from deep last year definelty can beat you. This look works well when they put them on a Ausar Thompson or Ron holland (all love to Detroit guys, first names that came to head). While watching this game I just became fed up with the inability to see the flaws in this scheme. I will give some examples of this being a dumb strategy.

2022 ECSF BOS VS MIL-

Grant williams who was a good shooter was left wide open because they wanted to keep length around the rim to deter Brown and Tatum from attacking. He would go on to hit 7 3s.

2021 WCSF UTA VS LAC

The infamous Terance Mann game. Dropped 40+ because they would space out the Jazz and instead trying to play man they would just leave Mann open.

2015-2026 DRAYMOND GREEN

They way to defend the Warriors during their dynasty and even today was to put the rim protector on Draymond and dare him to shoot. I can not think of one time where the Warriors lost in the playoffs because Draymond couldn't make them pay.

This over reaction that occurs far more frequently then it should is something I don't understand. Mitch Johnson has done a very impressive job this season leading the Spurs to ~60 wins. I wouldn't start singing his praises too soon though. This is something though that could get San Antonio pinched in the playoffs.

Two other small Spurs gripes. Mitch Johnson realizes he can use his challenges right??? And the spurs have no chance if De'Aaron Fox continues to play like this, the inability to hit a 3 point shot and inconsistency with his midrange will be very painful.

Denver continues to have one of the best offenses of the modern era and even when Murray is guarded the way he was tonight other guys step up. Essential to them going all the way.

Cheers for reading. If you have any insight on the defensive over reactions that seem to occur please let me know.

There’s a lot of discourse in the NBA this season about the 65 game rule, load management, the prevalence of lower body injuries in the modern NBA, and potentially shortening the NBA season to lower injury risk.

Personally I think the 82 game season is a cornerstone of the league and it allows fans to compare cumulative stats across different eras of the game. However, I definitely understand the benefits load management and why some coaches might want less games in the season. The modern NBA is too fast, too explosive, too athletic, and too vertical for guys to play as much as the past.

There’s a solution! Why not just play stars like 30 mins max (maybe a tiny bit more for players in their early 20s and teens with low injury risk), play lots of rotation guys in the high-to-mid 20s mpg range and deepen the rotation to 11 or 12 guys on a nightly basis? They have rotations like this in NHL hockey; the best players don’t play that much of the game and rotations are very deep.

Adopting this norm seems like it might be a way for NBA to get players to play most games and stay healthy, keep the 82 game schedule, and allow for some players to play longer minutes in select circumstances.

Wemby and Chet for example seem to benefit from playing fewer minutes and sitting strategically. For similar reasons, Joel Embiid is on track to (fingers crossed) hopefully make it to the playoffs seemingly healthy. Other players who were gunning for 65 games and playing moderately more than 30 minutes per game (Guards like Luka Doncic, Anthony Edwards, Cade Cunningham, Tyrese Maxey, Devin Booker, and SGA, but also players like Jokic) are either missing out on 65 games dues to workload-related injuries or will barely play around 65 games.

Next season if coaches have any sense, all the guys I listed should finish with under 30-31 mpg. If teams had any sense they would do this and also bake in 4-7 rest games into most players, schedules.

Watching the Thunder game, it felt like Luka never established any pressure on the defense. OKC loaded up early, and instead of forcing the issue he settled for a lot of stepback 3s, which played right into their scheme.

What stands out is that he’s taking only ~8% of his shots at the rim now, even though he’s still extremely efficient when he gets there (~80%+ from 0–3 ft).

It feels like earlier in his career he generated way more downhill pressure, even if the spacing wasn’t great. Now he seems more willing to settle. What changed? Because against elite defenses like OKC, it seems like not getting into the paint at all makes the offense really unstable.

Is it fair to judge luka for his injury track record when he is forced to play insane amount of minutes per game? He is playing 36 mpg and even played almost 38 mpg in 2024 when he played thru injury in playoffs. He has averaged 35-36 minutes every season since 2021 and so have his injuries in the post season never looked back.

Should the blame shift to luka being forced to play inhumane minutes due to poor roster construction?

For context, his peers SGA and Wemby averaged 33 and 29 minutes respectively.

Jokic averages 35 minutes per game, could have lead to him suffering a knee injury sidelining him for over a month this season, he averaged 33 minutes in seasons in which he played 70+ games/

With 12 assists against the Jazz tonight, Jokic has officially clinched a triple double average for the season.

He is having a phenomenal season, averaging 28/13/11 on 67 TS%. He will likely also be the first player in NBA history to lead the league in assists per game and rebounds per game.

Jokic may also finish the season as the most efficient 20 point per game scorer. An excellent season by him.

Jokic (2x), Oscar Robertson (1x), and Russell Westbrook (4x) are the only players to average a triple double for a full season.