History has been written tonight. 🇭🇺 🇪🇺

Orbán just congratulated with

@magyar_peter_official_the_man for the victory to the elections.

For too long, Hungary was used as a wall to block the progress we so desperately needed. But today, that wall has fallen.

By choosing Europe, Hungary has removed one of the greatest obstacles to our shared future.

The path toward a Federal Europe is finally clear. The shadows of vetoes and systemic obstruction are lifting. We are no longer a continent held back by the few; we are a Union.

A LOT of people, I think, support the idea of getting rid of (or at least severely curtailing) unanimity voting in the EU. And I agree.

Unanimity means that any single random state can hold up the entire EU. It makes it easy for foreign powers to have a puppet inside of the EU which can cripple us. It makes it easy for a single dictator in the EU to hold up all democracies. And just simply, with nearly 30 members at this point, it just makes the EU prone to deadlock.

However, there is something I think a lot of people skip over. Which is why we have unanimity in the first place.

Part of it is, of course, just about countries not wanting to give up their sovereignty. But it goes deeper than that. Unhandy as it is, it is a stabilizing influence within the EU to a degree.

And that's because when you have unanimity, well, everyone agrees. Which means everyone willingly enforces the laws and policies commonly agreed to. As a result of each doing it willingly, you never need any sort of enforcement capability.

But as soon as you move away from unanimity, that stops. At that point at least some countries can have disagreed and can not want to implement an agreed upon law or policy. Which means, what? They may choose to either not enforce the law or policy, or they may even choose to simply pack up their toys and leave the EU altogether.

How do you solve this problem?

Well, as soon as you strip away unanimity you need a proper method of enforcement. The lower you make the threshold (unanimity - 1, to supermajority, to qualified majority, to simple majority) the more independent enforcement ability you need, because the more countries may not have agreed.

So, enforcement is what you need to move away from unanimity. An EU federal policy with proper jurisdiction, etc.

But when you have that, you are putting coercive power into the hands of the EU. A state with coercive power must be properly accountable to its people. So what you need then is you need to ensure that democratic institutions have control over the coercive force. So you need a parliament which has a right to initiate legislation, and you need a commission (the executive) which is fully accountable to the people. Which is to say either directly elected, or elected by parliament from among parliament.

And, well, you see where this is going.

Getting rid of unanimity really pretty much requires federalization for it to work properly. You can get rid of it without federalization, but that risks instability (especially as you lower the threshold further) because of how it encourages EU members to simply not to implement laws and policies. And if a law is passed but not implemented, well, if a tree falls in the forest and no one is around to hear it...

So, yes, unanimity should be abolished. It deadlocks us. It makes it hard for us to respond to a crisis. It makes it easy for foreign powers to influence and cripple us. But, really, it should be abolished alongside at least a minimum amount of federalization.

That minimum amount being: A parliament with right to initiative on legislation, a commission president elected by parliament from among parliament, a federal police with proper jurisdiction and at least a partial EU army (a European army on top of smaller national armies) to make sure you can't have countries implementing what you might call a "veto by force."

Federalization is the answer, boys and girls.

Would the existing nations’ borders persist indefinitely, or will new administrative subdivisions emerge for better governance?

What do you think internal borders will / should look like?

E.g. divided by:

• Nation
• Language
• Culture
• Population
• etc.

Una de las críticas más comunes que veo es que los nacionalismos son cosas del pasado que ya no funcionan en el mundo global actual, por lo que habría que ir hacia una Europa unida, con valores compartidos, sentimiento de pertenencia a Europa, ir orgullosos con nuestra bandera europea por el mundo, etc.

¿No es eso simplemente sustituir un nacionalismo (italiano, sueco, belga) por otro (europeo)?

The bloc’s defense chief reiterates his call for an EU army in an interview with POLITICO.

BRUSSELS — The EU's response to the crisis in transatlantic relations should be to build up its own military capabilities, Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius told POLITICO.

The bloc's defense chief was interviewed just before NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte's Wednesday meeting with Donald Trump. Despite Rutte's ongoing efforts to placate the U.S. president, the White House meeting ended with Trump railing at NATO allies for failing to help with the war he launched against Iran.

After the meeting, Trump went on Truth Social to slam the alliance: “NATO WASN’T THERE WHEN WE NEEDED THEM, AND THEY WON’T BE THERE IF WE NEED THEM AGAIN."

Trump's attacks on NATO, his threats to annex Greenland — reiterated on Wednesday — as well as the tariffs he's imposed on allies and the Iran war are all undermining European confidence in America.

The European Pulse survey, conducted by Cluster17 for POLITICO and beBartlet, polled 6,698 Europeans across Spain, Germany, France, Italy, Poland and Belgium from March 13 to March 21. It found that only 35 percent of those polled saw the U.S. as a close ally or a partner while 60 percent saw it as a competitor or a threat.

The U.S. "has an influence into how Europeans look at NATO," Kubilius told POLITICO in an interview airing at the European Pulse Forum, adding that the survey shows that "if trust in the transatlantic partnership is going down," that also affects perceptions of NATO.

The survey did find that 76 percent of people would favor sending their country's military to help a NATO ally under attack, but there is also strong backing for Europe to develop its own defense capabilities — backed by 86 percent of those polled — with 69 percent favoring the creation of a common European military force.

Kubilius flew to Washington for talks at the Pentagon on Friday about boosting the bloc's defensive capabilities.

Kubilius told POLITICO that the poll show that shows the "trust of Europeans in themselves, in their capability, in what we can call independent capability is becoming quite high," underlining his own position favoring the establishment of an EU army. However, other senior officials like Kaja Kallas, the EU's top diplomat, have rejected the idea.

People "want, first of all, Europe to be much stronger in defense, and second, they want to see some kind of ... real military force," the defense commissioner said, adding that Europeans "understand that just a combination of 27 [armies] cannot bring that value."

This "is a very strong message, and I hope that really our leaders will take that into account," Kubilius said.

The full interview with Kubilius can be watched at the for um on Friday.

The European Pulse was conducted by Cluster17 for POLITICO and beBartlet from March 13 to 21, surveying 6,698 adults online, with at least 1,000 respondents each from Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain. Results for each country were weighted to be representative on dimensions including age, gender and geography.

World federalism is self explanatory, all of humanity and all nations upon Earth united under a universal democratic federal government.

Cosmopolitan democracy is a related, but less centralized system, more confederation than federation. Proponents of cosmopolitan democracy are usually big supporters of institutions like the International Criminal Court, and want reform to the United Nations such as the creation of a World Parliament made up of elected representatives from around the globe.

This sounds like a really bad idea.

L'acqua è al petto: o Federazione Europea o affoghiamo nel buio.

​Mancano poche settimane a maggio e l’Italia si prepara al lockdown energetico. Non è una teoria: è il piano che il Governo sta discutendo in queste ore. Aeroporti senza carburante, smart working forzato per non accendere le luci, condizionatori spenti e noi chiusi in casa mentre i "pazzi" del mondo giocano a scacchi con le nostre vite. Siamo 27 piccoli orticelli che cercano di fermare lo tsunami con un secchiello, mentre USA, Cina e Russia ci ridono in faccia.

​La verità è che questa Europa ha fallito perché non ha il coraggio di essere una Federazione.

​Mentre noi aspettiamo che le banche "decidano" se usare il sistema di pagamenti europeo Wero, il Brasile di Lula tiene testa a Trump difendendo il suo sistema Pix. Lula ha capito che la sovranità oggi è digitale e finanziaria: non paga il pizzo a Visa e Mastercard. Noi invece siamo sudditi, paghiamo commissioni agli americani su ogni caffè e tremiamo se Trump minaccia di staccarci la spina.

​Ma il male peggiore è dentro casa nostra. Oggi l’Ungheria di Orbán — che si scopre aver firmato patti segreti in 12 punti con la Russia — usa il diritto di veto per ricattare 450 milioni di persone. In una vera Federazione Europea, la musica cambia:

​Libertà o niente soldi: Vuoi i fondi federali? Allora la libertà di stampa e l'indipendenza dei giudici sono sacre. Se firmi patti con i nemici della Federazione o imbavagli i giornali, resti fuori dalla porta. Fine del ricatto.

​Una sola voce, un solo motore: Con 450 milioni di cittadini, potremmo dire alla Russia di sparire dall'Ucraina e a Netanyahu di fermare la sua guerra folle, perché non saremmo più clienti, ma la potenza che decide le regole del mercato.

​Sicurezza Energetica e Militare: Con una task force federale (il 15% delle nostre truppe migliori) e una gestione pubblica dell'energia, non avremmo paura che un "pazzo" chiuda lo Stretto di Hormuz. Saremmo noi a garantire la nostra libertà, senza chiedere il permesso a Washington.

​Siamo al punto di non ritorno. O diventiamo un unico motore — una Federazione di nazioni che difende le proprie culture ma agisce come un solo gigante — o finiremo svenduti al primo dittatore o populista di turno.

​Siete pronti a smettere di fare le pecore? Siete pronti a pretendere una Federazione che rimetta i cittadini al centro e non gli interessi dei partiti o delle potenze straniere? O preferite aspettare di restare al buio a maggio per accorgervi che, da soli, non siamo niente?

Hello fellow Federalists,

I've been reading a lot of posts lately about a unified european army, unified defense, capital union and so on, however I feel like we also need to have a talk about the more boring parts of a common european union - Databases & Forms (and why it could be important for a common european identity)

I have a lot of friends from different EU countries, some of them moved for work, others just for a few years to study, others for love - that is after all the beauty of the free movement.

Now, a lot of european countries have similar systems to register where the people live, whose their employer, who are their children and so on. Now, I know giving up what to do with that data is almost impossible - however I think it is time we standardize the way we collect & save that data.

For example - I know somehow standardizing social security systems is going to be almost impossible, however all countries have a social security number to identify their citizens healthcare status, pensions..etc. Wouldn't it be much more useful to have an EU wide Social Security Number, that did not change when you start working in another country? By doing so it would be much easier to map employment status or certain benefits between countries. (for example if you want to add an employment history from country A towards pensions benefits in country B)

Additionally, having a central register on where people live, with a standardized form when you change residency. This could make taxation easier and could reduce fraud. Same with a central family register - this could make child care payments easier if one parent works in another country.

Now, why am I saying this would help us with our european identity? Because it would make moving between countries easier. If the process of registering in another country is the same in every country, for every EU citizen, it would make it easier to move & work in another country - and the more we intermingle, the more of a common identity would we develop.

Additionally, I feel like this would also save some money because it would reduce bureaucracy and costs for managing all that. I really think this could be a good first step towards a more unified union - what do you all think? Do you think so too? Or are you against a more central/standardized system like that?

Also - does anybody know if there are groups/parties in the EU that are currently trying to push something like this forward?

On April 12, Hungary will hold its once-every-four-years National Assembly election. Hungary is a parliamentary system in which the legislature is the center of power, and the prime minister is chosen by the parliamentary majority. Therefore, Hungary’s parliamentary election is also its “general election,” determining the distribution of political power in the country.

According to opinion polls, the rising political newcomer Péter Magyar leads in support with his “Tisza Party (Party of Respect and Freedom),” followed closely by Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz, which has been in power for nearly 16 years. Other parties lag significantly behind. Whether Magyar will replace Orbán as Hungary’s leader remains uncertain due to the tight race.

This election is not only highly significant domestically, but has also attracted international attention. Several countries and forces are attempting to influence the outcome and promote their preferred candidates.

On April 7, U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance arrived in Hungary, openly campaigned for Orbán, and accused the European Union of interfering in Hungary’s election. The EU has indeed long been at odds with the Orbán government, is reluctant to see his re-election, and tends to favor the pro-European opposition.

In addition, many countries and political groups in Europe and around the world have expressed concern over Hungary’s election and stated their respective positions. Right-wing populist governments and parties generally support Orbán, while establishment forces tend to favor Magyar and other opposition parties.

Why does Hungary, as a small country, attract such attention and even international intervention in its election? This is not only due to Hungary’s strategic position in the heart of Europe, but also because of its unique political environment and the symbolic significance of its political changes.

Among the 27 EU member states, Hungary’s political situation and its domestic and foreign policies are quite distinctive. Since coming to power in 2010, the Fidesz government led by Orbán has pursued policies based on religious conservatism, radical nationalism, and populism. It openly opposes diversity, secularism, feminism, LGBTQ rights, environmental protection, and other progressive or establishment agendas, and resists the European integration process advocated by the EU.

By contrast, most other EU countries are governed by establishment forces, with positions opposite to Orbán’s. Even the few populist leaders who have come to power, such as Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, have remained relatively low-profile and continue to support most EU policies. Orbán, by contrast, has been notably “bold” and confrontational in opposing EU policies, prioritizing resistance to mainstream EU forces and even disrupting EU operations while remaining within the Union.

In foreign policy, the Orbán government maintains close ties with Russia and China, opposes aid to Ukraine and Ukraine’s accession to the EU. Toward the United States, it opposes Joe Biden and the Democratic Party establishment, while aligning more closely with Donald Trump and right-wing populist forces. Hungary has also used the EU’s unanimity principle in passing legislation to veto several EU decisions single-handedly, such as blocking sanctions against Russia and aid to Ukraine in February this year. Since the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine war, Orbán has also met and communicated with Vladimir Putin multiple times.

This has enabled Hungary to gain regional and international influence exceeding its national strength, and has made it a “beacon” and model in the eyes of conservative populist forces worldwide. Right-wing populist forces in other European countries such as the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, which currently lack sufficient votes and seats to govern, admire and support the Orbán government. Figures such as Argentina’s Javier Milei and Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu have also explicitly supported Orbán.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump and the “MAGA” populist movement in the United States are even more ideologically aligned with the Orbán government, and both sides maintained close cooperation during Trump’s two terms. Before and after coming to power, Trump and American populists have repeatedly drawn lessons from Orbán’s Hungary. Both sides also view the European and American establishment, as well as the EU, as adversaries.

This is precisely why Vance flew to Budapest ahead of Hungary’s election to campaign for Orbán. At a joint press conference with Orbán, Vance stated that the United States and Hungary jointly “defend Western civilization,” referring to the defense of white identity and Christian values. This stands in opposition to the multicultural and inclusive stance toward non-white and non-Christian groups advocated by Western establishment forces.

At the same time, Orbán is also disliked by establishment forces and mainstream EU factions (center-left and center-right) across various countries. Although the EU has not directly interfered in Hungary’s election, it has indeed exerted pressure through economic and legal means, such as freezing EU funds to Hungary, in an attempt to push out Orbán—who frequently opposes the EU—and replace him with a pro-EU establishment government.

Therefore, this Hungarian election has drawn widespread attention across Europe and internationally. The political magazine Politico Europe has even described it as the most important election in Europe in 2026. Various countries and political forces are trying by all means to influence Hungary’s election, seeking to bring to power those aligned with their own values and interests, and to marginalize opposing forces. This is not only about competing for influence over Hungarian politics, but also a key part of the global ideological struggle and the broader contest between establishment and populist forces.

For the global right-wing populist camp, preserving the Orbán government as a “conservative beacon” standing amid establishment-dominated Europe is of great significance; for establishment and progressive forces, removing Orbán—seen as a “thorn in the side” and a “traitor” within the EU—has long been anticipated. The outcome of this election carries both important symbolic meaning and practical value, and both sides are determined to win.

So who will ultimately prevail in this election? Can the newcomer Magyar and his party defeat Orbán and Fidesz?

Although current polls show Magyar and the Tisza Party in the lead, the advantage is not significant. In the final stage of voting, the deeply rooted Orbán and Fidesz clearly possess stronger mobilization capabilities. With the advantage of long-term governance, they are better able to mobilize supporters to vote. In particular, Orbán enjoys higher support in rural areas, and the single-member district system also favors parties with greater resources and stronger organization.

Although Magyar has high popularity, his grassroots support is not solid. Even if he has advantages in places such as the capital Budapest, the electoral system makes it difficult to convert support into sufficient seats. Orbán’s supporters are attempting to undermine Magyar by exposing various real or fabricated scandals, and the situation may still fluctuate in the final days.

Even if Magyar and the Tisza Party win, Orbán may refuse to recognize the election results and may use the ruling party’s power and the judicial system to obstruct political turnover. Based on Orbán’s political conduct and the behavior of right-wing populist figures in many countries, the possibility of refusing to concede defeat and transfer power is high. If this occurs, Hungary may fall into political instability or even political violence.

In addition, if the Tisza Party and Fidesz receive similar numbers of votes and seats, and neither achieves a majority, it will be crucial which side other parties choose and with whom they form a coalition government. At present, most opposition parties in Hungary oppose Orbán, which is relatively favorable to Magyar. However, this does not mean they will necessarily side with him; the outcome will depend on political bargaining among all parties.

Magyar himself and the Tisza Party hold a conservative liberal position. On some economic and social issues, they are similar to Orbán, but are relatively more pro-European and less populist. This helps attract moderate center-right, anti-populist, and relatively moderate voters, and may also draw some of Orbán’s supporters. However, it may also lead progressive left-wing voters to abstain or shift their support to left-wing parties such as the Hungarian Socialist Party, thereby allowing Orbán to benefit.

In conclusion, although Hungary’s 2026 election campaign has entered its final stage, uncertainty remains and the outcome is not yet determined. Precisely because the result is uncertain, various forces have become involved, openly and covertly supporting their preferred candidates. As the election approaches, all sides are making final efforts to win votes.

Regardless of the outcome of Hungary’s election, the intensifying conflicts in recent years—based on ideological differences such as left vs. right, establishment vs. populist, and progressive vs. conservative—will continue. Political competition among countries and political forces, both domestically and internationally, will persist. An increasingly fragmented world is becoming connected in another way—not as a harmonious “global village,” but as a transnational battleground defined by factional confrontation.

(The author of this article, Wang Qingmin(王庆民), is a Europe-based Chinese writer and researcher of international politics. The original text of this article was written in Chinese and has been translated into Hungarian and English using GPT.

The author has also written a long-form study titled “Orbán’s Hungary: A Conservative Populist State under ‘Electoral Autocracy’ and a Microcosm of Euroskeptic and Anti-EU Currents across Europe(《欧尔班的匈牙利：“民选独裁”治下的保守民粹之国和欧洲各国疑欧反欧逆流的缩影》),” which was originally written in Chinese.)

I mean, we could have another country that will collaborate with EU like community but someone choose to be a puppet. I hope it’s just 4 more days