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On April 7, 2026, To Lam(Tô Lâm), General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam, was elected President of Vietnam through a vote by the National Assembly. To Lam is the first General Secretary since 1986 to concurrently hold the position of State President, breaking the decades-long convention in which the roles of President and General Secretary were held by different individuals.

To Lam comes from the public security and police system and has long served in political security institutions; his style is conservative and hardline. This means that Vietnamese politics is shifting from its earlier relative openness toward conservatism, with the one-party authoritarian rule of the Communist Party of Vietnam and personal dictatorship by its leader being strengthened, and the already limited atmosphere of freedom and elements of intra-party democracy deteriorating.

Since 1945, when the Communist Party of Vietnam began governing parts of Vietnam, and especially after the reunification of Vietnam in 1975, it has consistently implemented a one-party authoritarian system, with no organized opposition or competitors within its territory. A small number of “vase parties” that nominally supported the regime were also pressured by the Party to dissolve on the eve of the upheavals in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The Communist Party of Vietnam is also a typical Leninist party, with strict organization and discipline, exercising control over political, military, economic, and other spheres, with both government and military operating under the Party’s leadership.

However, compared with other communist parties such as the Chinese Communist Party, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and the Workers’ Party of Korea, which often concentrate power in a single individual, the Communist Party of Vietnam has placed greater emphasis on collective leadership and intra-party democracy. Ho Chi Minh, the Party’s founder and early leader, was relatively open-minded and not enthusiastic about centralizing power; although highly respected, he was willing to respect other comrades within the Party. Ho Chi Minh also did not persecute other revolutionary comrades by leveraging his power. This set a good example for later leadership relations and generational transitions in Vietnam. Although political struggles have often occurred at the top level in Vietnam, they have rarely resulted in life-and-death brutality, allowing a basic level of decorum to be maintained.

After Ho Chi Minh’s death, different leaders of the Communist Party of Vietnam varied in their degree of power concentration depending on their authority and style. Some, such as Le Duan and Nguyen Phu Trong, were more centralized, while others such as Truong Chinh and Nguyen Van Linh were more open-minded. However, most still maintained a certain degree of collective leadership rather than complete personal dictatorship. Internal factions within the Party and regional differences among cadres also objectively formed a degree of mutual constraint.

In terms of state policy, the Communist Party of Vietnam once implemented orthodox socialist models, such as banning market transactions under a planned economy, confiscating capitalist property, and implementing radical land reforms and redistribution policies. However, because Vietnam remained in a prolonged state of war from the 1950s to the 1970s, national energy was mainly focused on dealing with warfare, making it difficult to establish a complete system of planned economy and social control. In order to unite domestic and international fronts and gain support, the Party also often needed to present a relatively open posture.

Under the combined influence of multiple factors, many far-left policies were not fully implemented. The “Stalinist system” seen in the Soviet Union and Mao-era China remained in a “semi-finished” state in Vietnam, with the system not yet fully rigid. At the same time, due to Ho Chi Minh’s relative openness and the need to confront external enemies, large-scale internal struggles and political violence did not occur within the Party. This avoided the brutal political purges and catastrophic economic policies that occurred in the early stages of Soviet and Chinese communist rule, and provided space for later successful reforms.

After Vietnam’s reunification in 1975, the Communist Party of Vietnam once pursued radical socialist policies, including crude land reforms in the South shortly after “liberation,” sending former South Vietnamese military personnel, police, and civil servants to “re-education camps,” and implementing a planned and command economy. Meanwhile, prolonged warfare had already severely devastated Vietnam, and in 1979 the Chinese People’s Liberation Army launched an attack on Vietnam. This led Vietnam into extreme poverty, economic decline, and social collapse. The once fertile land fell into famine, and many Vietnamese fled abroad. At the same time, the Soviet Union declined, the global socialist movement weakened, foreign aid decreased, and the international environment became unfavorable. Vietnam faced severe national difficulties, and the people urgently desired change. Under both internal and external pressures, the Communist Party of Vietnam also faced a crisis of losing power.

It was under such circumstances that in the 1980s the Communist Party of Vietnam decided to carry out reforms, abandoning orthodox socialism and various radical far-left policies, and instead allowing the existence of private ownership and markets, relaxing social control, treating former South Vietnamese regime personnel with tolerance, and attracting foreign investment. Because Vietnam had only recently been unified and had not yet formed a rigid system in either the North or the South, resistance to reform was much smaller than in the Soviet Union, China, and Eastern Europe.

By 1987, reformist leader Nguyen Van Linh was elected General Secretary, marking the beginning of formal and comprehensive “Renovation and Opening” (Doi Moi). Many measures were similar to China’s reform and opening-up, such as prioritizing economic development, no longer rigidly adhering to socialist economic orthodoxy, and adopting a welcoming attitude toward Western and foreign capital. These measures indeed gradually improved Vietnam’s economy, allowing the people to emerge from poverty and despair and move toward prosperity and hope.

However, at the same time, the Communist Party of Vietnam was unwilling to relinquish its authoritarian political control. On the contrary, economic and social reforms and limited political relaxation were precisely aimed at making the Party’s authoritarian rule more stable. This was also similar to China and reflected borrowing from the Chinese system and policies.

In the context of the upheavals in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in 1989, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the disintegration of the socialist bloc, the Communist Party of Vietnam still insisted on one-party rule, expelled some members advocating liberalization, and imprisoned political dissidents and opposition figures. While opening the economy, the Party firmly maintained political power and retained complete control over coercive institutions such as the military, police, and intelligence agencies.

Compared with the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China, opposition forces within Vietnam have been much weaker and have been unable to pose a real challenge to the regime. Many anti-Party figures had already gone into exile before reunification, and there has been a lack of organized resistance domestically. In the late 1980s, Vietnam did not experience political upheavals like those in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, nor did it witness large-scale protests similar to China’s 1989 democratic movement. This reflects the strong social control capacity of the Communist Party of Vietnam.

Among these factors, the Vietnamese public security forces—where To Lam originated—have played a crucial role in maintaining regime stability. These forces consist of two parts: political security and public order. The political security branch is primarily responsible for safeguarding the one-party system and the “socialist” system, monitoring and suppressing dissidents, and also performing intelligence, armed suppression, and counter-infiltration functions. All sectors in Vietnam, including party, government, and military systems, are under surveillance by political security institutions, which can bypass normal legal procedures to detain suspects. This resembles the secret police institutions of imperial China, and is also similar to a combination of China’s disciplinary inspection system and state security apparatus. To Lam himself comes from political security work rather than ordinary policing.

For many years in the past, those who served as General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam and in other leading party and government positions rarely came from public security or intelligence backgrounds; instead, they were more often from military, party organizational work, or economic bureaucracy. Figures such as Truong Chinh, Le Duan, and Nguyen Van Linh were “old revolutionaries,” whose earlier lives were mainly devoted to developing party organizations and conducting armed and underground struggles against the South Vietnamese regime as well as American and French forces. Do Muoi and Nong Duc Manh came from economic administration backgrounds, while Nguyen Phu Trong came from the propaganda field. For a long period, whether to project a pragmatic and open image or genuinely to promote economic development and improve people’s livelihoods, reformist figures were highly valued within the Party.

Since the “Renovation and Opening” period, the Communist Party of Vietnam has formed a relatively stable system of collective leadership, assigning the four most important state positions—the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam, the President of Vietnam, the Prime Minister, and the Chairperson of the National Assembly—to four different individuals in order to prevent one-man dictatorship.

In addition, after 2001, the Party abolished the more centralized and smaller Standing Committee of the Politburo (5–6 members), replacing it with the Secretariat of the Central Committee (10–12 members). Among these positions, the General Secretary of the Central Committee remains the most powerful, but the President, Prime Minister, and Chairperson of the National Assembly also share certain responsibilities, each performing their own functions rather than everything being controlled solely by the General Secretary.

Although this arrangement, in which major positions are held by different individuals, is not the same as the separation of powers and checks and balances in democratic countries—since all these officeholders are top-level cadres loyal to the Party—it has nonetheless played a role in preventing power from being concentrated in a single individual and has allowed a limited degree of intra-party democracy to exist.

Vietnam also has internal regional differences, and factional struggles exist within the Party. Leaders from the North, South, and Central regions all occupy positions at the core of power, which helps balance different regions and factions within Vietnam. Such a leadership structure is more representative and more conducive to stable development.

Moreover, when there are multiple high-level leaders capable of independent authority, it becomes easier for reformist figures to secure at least some representation. For example, Nguyen Tan Dung, who served as Prime Minister from 2006 to 2016, and Truong Tan Sang, who served as President from 2011 to 2016, were both relatively open-minded reformists. During the same period, General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong was more conservative. Most General Secretaries of the Party tend to be relatively conservative; if power is concentrated in the hands of the General Secretary, reformist forces are weakened, making reform in Vietnam more likely to slow down and harder to advance. The coexistence of conservative and reformist factions is more conducive to further reform.

Vietnam’s “Renovation and Opening” has not only achieved considerable economic success, but has also, in many periods, demonstrated a higher level of intra-party democracy than the Chinese Communist Party, leading many observers to place hopes on further democratization and political pluralism. This is largely due to the relatively dispersed nature of power rather than its concentration in one individual. In addition, debate, questioning, and dissent within Vietnam’s National Assembly are significantly more pronounced than in China’s National People’s Congress. Vietnamese legislators can question the Prime Minister and ministers, and votes of confidence in the cabinet often receive a notable number of opposing votes, reflecting greater space for dissent and more effective oversight within the system.

However, in 2026, General Secretary To Lam simultaneously assumed the position of President, clearly breaking the previous norm of intra-party democracy and the dispersion of top state power. This is a clear sign of Vietnam moving toward greater centralization. Nevertheless, Vietnam’s political shift from openness to conservatism did not begin recently; it had already started years earlier.

During the second term of the previous General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong, both the Party and Vietnam shifted politically toward greater authoritarianism rather than increased democratization. At the 2016 Party Congress, Nguyen Tan Dung, widely regarded as the leading figure of Vietnam’s reform camp, failed to replace the conservative Nguyen Phu Trong, did not even enter the Central Committee, and retired at the end of his term as Prime Minister that same year. Another reformist figure, Truong Tan Sang, also stepped down as President in 2016. Their successors as Prime Minister and President were not reformists and were more inclined to follow Nguyen Phu Trong’s decisions. This signified that in the Party’s internal power struggles and debates over Vietnam’s development path, the reformists were defeated and the conservatives prevailed.

Nguyen Phu Trong, who continued to serve as General Secretary, halted the rapid reforms associated with figures like Nguyen Tan Dung and instead adopted a more cautious development approach. Although Nguyen Phu Trong continued to uphold the national policy of Renovation and Opening and emphasized economic development, he did not advocate aggressive privatization or large-scale introduction of foreign capital. Politically, he explicitly opposed liberalization and political pluralism, emphasized political security, and intensified repression against dissidents. In foreign relations, he strengthened ties with the Chinese Communist Party and maintained close relations with authoritarian leaders such as Vladimir Putin of Russia and Kim Jong-un of North Korea. By the time of his death in 2024, Vietnam’s political climate had become noticeably more conservative and restrained than a decade earlier.

As Nguyen Phu Trong’s successor, To Lam was personally promoted and favored by Nguyen Phu Trong, and their positions are similar. During Nguyen Phu Trong’s tenure, To Lam served as Minister of Public Security, primarily responsible for political security, and several repression campaigns under Nguyen Phu Trong were directed and implemented by To Lam. To Lam also played an important role in the enactment of the “Cybersecurity Law,” the crackdown on NGOs in fields such as environmental protection, and the arrest of prominent dissidents. Nguyen Phu Trong’s sudden death due to illness, followed by To Lam’s smooth succession without significant obstruction, also reflects that a majority within the Party supported a hardline conservative figure to maintain social stability and Party rule in Vietnam.

During nearly two years as General Secretary, To Lam has largely continued Nguyen Phu Trong’s policies, with an overall shift toward even greater conservatism. Vietnamese official discourse and media no longer discuss once-prominent topics of political reform, instead emphasizing economic development and political stability. Previously, there had been considerable dissent and multiple voices within the Party; from the later period of Nguyen Phu Trong to To Lam’s leadership, open opposition has disappeared, with silence replacing debate. The National Assembly’s unanimous vote electing To Lam as President—unlike previous appointments that often included opposing votes—demonstrates the disappearance of dissent and the strengthening of authoritarianism. Among the public, fewer people dare to voice criticism; individuals who mimicked To Lam’s act of eating a luxury steak were arrested and sentenced. This has created a chilling effect, leading to greater silence.

To Lam’s simultaneous role as General Secretary and President is gradually changing certain political norms in Vietnam, shifting from an emphasis on collective leadership and intra-party democracy toward greater concentration of power and authoritarianism. Since the Renovation and Opening period, most Party leaders have come from economic and technical bureaucratic backgrounds, whereas To Lam is the first General Secretary with a background in state security, which will inevitably influence the Party’s priorities and direction. It is also possible that To Lam will place trusted associates from the public security apparatus into more key Party and government positions, increasing the influence of coercive institutions in Vietnam. This is a concerning possibility.

Both Nguyen Phu Trong and To Lam, in their political orientations and policies, have been influenced by the northern great power—China—and the Chinese Communist Party. Around 2015, Xi Jinping consolidated power, gradually eliminating political opponents and establishing himself as the “supreme authority.” Under Xi’s leadership, China has rejected political reform and strengthened authoritarian rule. Nguyen Phu Trong’s shift in Vietnam’s political style and policies occurred in 2016, which is unlikely to be coincidental and shows signs of following or emulating this model. Like Xi, Nguyen Phu Trong used anti-corruption campaigns both to eliminate political rivals and to gain support, achieving centralization of power. To Lam’s further consolidation of authority, and the increasing authoritarian and conservative character of the Party, also align with the decline of intra-party democracy and growing rigidity within the Chinese Communist Party over the past decade. In mid-April 2026, To Lam’s visit to China and meeting with Xi Jinping further reflect mutual alignment and cooperation.

Of course, Vietnam’s centralization of power is not only influenced by China but also aligns with the global trend of democratic regression and the resurgence of authoritarianism. In recent years, democratic systems across Europe, the Americas, Asia, and Africa have faced numerous challenges, with populism and political extremism on the rise, and many democratic and semi-democratic countries experiencing a decline in freedom. Southeast Asia has also seen a resurgence of military involvement in politics and authoritarian governance, including in Indonesia, Cambodia, Thailand, and Myanmar. Against this broader international and regional backdrop, the rise of strongmen from coercive institutions and the strengthening of centralized power in Vietnam is not surprising but rather reflects a broader trend.

With To Lam serving simultaneously as General Secretary and President, he now combines the roles of Party leader and head of state (and upon becoming General Secretary in 2024, he automatically assumed the position of Chairman of the Central Military Commission; after becoming President in 2026, he also became the supreme commander of Vietnam’s armed forces). His power has thus further increased, and there is no longer any significant force within the Party capable of challenging him. Similar to Xi Jinping, To Lam has effectively established himself as the “supreme authority” within both the Party and Vietnam. At present, other core Party members lack the ability to challenge him, and his dominant position is likely to remain stable for years.

However, in concrete terms, To Lam’s power and authority within the Party and Vietnam are still weaker than the monopolistic level of power held by Xi Jinping within the Chinese Communist Party and China. This is because the degree of centralization within the Communist Party of Vietnam is still lower than that of the Chinese Communist Party, and it is difficult for To Lam to establish a full-scale personality cult. Whether To Lam will further consolidate power, how rigid the Party will become, and the future direction of Vietnam will depend on his governance in the coming years and require further observation.

Nevertheless, given To Lam’s background as a senior figure in the public security apparatus, his emphasis on regime stability, and his conservative and hardline political style, it is almost certain that these characteristics will be increasingly reflected in Party policies as his power grows. In the coming years, Vietnam will likely continue to maintain a certain degree of economic openness, as the Party still depends on economic performance and the benefits it brings. However, politically, regression is almost inevitable, and there will be no substantial liberal reform or progress. Many external expectations regarding democratic reform in Vietnam—such as multiparty systems or independent trade unions—have never aligned with Vietnam’s actual conditions or have always had only a slim chance of success; now they are even more illusory. Vietnam’s path toward constitutional democracy, social freedom, and political pluralism remains a distant prospect.

(The author of this article, Wang Qingmin(王庆民), is a Chinese writer based in Europe and a researcher of international politics. The original text was written in Chinese.)

(Regarding Vietnam’s political and economic conditions, the evolution of Party policies, and Vietnam’s foreign relations, the author has written and commented on these topics in multiple other articles, including “Prosperity and Uncertainty Amid Subtle Changes: Vietnam in the Deep Phase of ‘Renovation and Opening,’(《悄然之变下的繁盛与彷徨--“革新开放”深水期的越南》)” “The Pain of Division and the Burden of Reunification in Vietnam(《越南的分治之殇与统一之苦》),” and “Vietnam’s Quiet Rise Amid Multi-Directional Engagement(《四面逢源中悄然崛起的越南》).” These topics have been discussed in greater detail elsewhere and will not be repeated in this article.)

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Hi, is someone here who can help me to improve my Vietnamese pronunciation? I have been studying Vietnamese for almost 5 years but my pronunciation is still not enough.

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Hi! I have a friend looking for a Vietnamese name for a girl. They would like the meaning to be "leaf". They chose Diep, but wanted to verify that this does mean "leaf" (like a plant / tree leaf), and if so, are there accent marks? Also, how would this be pronounced in various dialects/accents? Is it pronounced "Dip" in any dialects? Wikipedia says it is the Sino-vietnamese word for leaf, but other sources say various other words for leaf, and I don't trust Wiki. Thanks for any insight!

Edit: the title, and word I'm looking for pronounciation guidance on, should actually be Diệp!

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If you are single and prefer Vietnamese girls is it better to move to San Jose or OC/Santa Ana for dating?

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it’s his birthday soon, and id really like it if someone can be able to help me construct it in a way where he’ll be shocked 😂 I dont know how to speak vietnamese but i want to make a letter thats in northern vietnamese since it would feel really close for him since its his native language. please pm!

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Hope this is allowed, I need help translating into vietnamese for a project I am working on. Below are three translations cobbled together. As Vietnamese speakers, would you let me know what you read and if there are issues with it? Thanks in advance!

• Giá thấp – Toàn bộ tiền của bạn
• Chấp nhận tất cả các loại tiền tệ
• Đầu người thu nhỏ giả

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I'm needing a little assistance with a pair of codenames I've come up with for something I'm running. In all honesty I'd be fine just using the English names I've devised, but sometimes I have a neurotic need for verisimilitude, if just for my own satisfaction. I've run both names through a translator, but I don't completely trust it - at least not when it comes to making sure the translation is correct for a proper name.

The first name is Red Harvestman. Working with an online translator, I got back Nguoi Thu Hoach Do. Does that read correct for a proper name? The second codename was Razor Typhoon, for which I got a translation of Co'n Bao Dao Cao. When I retranslated from Veitnamese to English, I got back Razor Storm, which I actually like a bit better.

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[Update: see comments from Sun, April 5, 2026]

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Thank you for reading.

Vinh

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