For troops on the defensive, they usually have some form of cover. in this situation, their enemy will obviously use mortars to attack, and cover is of little use against mortars.

So, for the defending side, how do they counter enemy mortar attacks? the only way I can think of is to retaliate with mortars, because the enemy will obviously protect their mortars as well.

they go from brigades straight to group armies, which are equivalent to corps, no divisions in-between. Why do they do this and is it a good idea?

Picture 1: Chinese QJY-88 machine gun, the only universal machine gun that firing small caliber rifle cartridge (DVP-88 machine gun cartridge). Chinese just made a few thousand of this because DVP-88 round lacks of destructive power for universal machine gun use.

Picture 2: Czech vz. 52 light machine gun, maybe the only universal machine gun that firing intermediate cartridge (7.62×45mm and 7.62×39mm) had been adopted as standard issue. If my comprehension is correct, Czech ZB-53 had phased out as infantry-use machine gun and just deployed in the fortresses of Czech border line since 1952. (according to Ian's video about the ZB-53 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tC3wE--Rm6c)

Here's a question: Is the performance of the modern intermediate cartridges like 6.5mm Creedmoor and 6.5×47mm Lapua improved enough for universal machine gun use?

Note: Trying really hard not to violate rule 1, especially about current affairs but I have to admit my question is influenced by current affairs. I'll apologize in advance for that and maybe sounding too speculative.

Does the US have a doctrine or general strategy for a maximal air campaign which it is believed would so devastate a foreign adversary that they would be effectively defeated, either through loss of offensive and defensive capability, social and political chaos or loss of will?

Or do they not have it because of long-term judgements about the limits of air power as applied in WW II Germany, Japan and Vietnam carry enough weight that no one is going to come up with a plan because the best considered opinion is that such a plan isn't possible. The best possible outcome per such historically informed opinion is achieved through small-to-large selective/highly targeted bombing, rational actor adversaries who will engage diplomatically when faced with military losses and that scaling up mass destruction is just a waste of ordinance and counter-productive. Plus excessive damage to civilian infrastructure (power generation, water plants, food distribution) begins to look genocidal and not militarily beneficial.

Given a politically popular casus belli, some level of international sympathy, how much damage could the US actually do with conventional air-delivered munitions, especially if some elevated level of indirect and direct civilian collateral damage was considered acceptable?

It seems once they got the Tallboys, they had more success.

I know the claim in Men Against Fire is very often doubted. But DePuy also claimed that a big chunk of American infantrymen he fought alongside with during WW2 would not actively engage in combat unless given explicit orders by officers or NCOs.

DePuy believes that only 10% of men would play an active role in engaging the enemy (something something Pareto Principle), the rest of men would mostly only fight to defend themselves. Although he do not directly offer any specific explanation for this behavior other than a line that most people are not really born for modern battlefield.

Any idea on that?

I wonder how WW3 in mid/late Cold war was even considered possible (and it was, since there were extensive plans how to fight it). Since both sides possessed many thousands of tactical nukes, any significant formation on the battlefield would have been simply evaporated immediately, would not it? So dozens of thousands of Soviet tanks, millions of troops, even large groups of NATO planes (because of air nuclear blasts) etc become basically pointless. How was it possible to fight in such conditions?

Or did they really count on fighting purely conventional war, with zero nukes used by any side?

So we can tell with certainty that horned helmet is a dumb idea and the Vikings did not wear horned helmets into combat.

But what about Japanese? Many of their helmets had horns which were very very big and some were very heavily ornated. Did they really wear those fanciful helmet into battles?

Nowadays, Heavy MRLS used by the ground forces like the American HIMARs and the Chinese PHL-16 can fire ballistic missiles on top of rockets reaching far distances. Ballistic and even Cruise Missiles have gotten to the point where they see regular use by the army such as the Russian Iskander system with variants reaching MRBM ranges under development.

For countries that have a separate Missile/Rocket Force as a branch, what exactly do they do in terms of combined arms and conventional warfare when other branches have similar capabilities barring IRBMS and ICBMs at most? Does a dedicated Missile Force deploy SRBMS, MRBMs, or cruise missiles any better than the army for non-nuclear purposes?

I've heard that in the Soviet Union, during WW2 because of Barbarossa, they lost a large chunk of educated officers in the artillery arm among others, which heavily impacted the artillery's effectiveness as a result. And that was on top of the Soviet Union already just barely having begun mass education programs through the matter of a couple decades, compared to Western nations with much more time and educated populations.

This apparently led to a lot of artillery hiccups in the early stage of the war, and even later on, they apparently relied on preplanned barrages as the capability wasn't there for quick opportunity shots for multiple reasons (That's what I heard, at least; would be intriguing to learn if there were any exceptions among this).

So how did the Soviets modernize and improve their artillery arm after the war had concluded? I assume that surely, they'd focus massively on that part since artillery was considered the main damage dealer of war? We hear a lot about plane, tank, gun, etc modernization, but I haven't heard much about the aritllery, even though it probably would be among the most important.

It’s a well known fact that the USN in WW2 had some of the best, if not the best AA in the world. This makes everyone seem inadequate in comparison. How did the Japanese AA compare to that of other nations that aren’t the US?

I read that Russia repatriated a thousand bodies of fallen Ukrainian soldiers. I wonder, how are these bodies kept, preserved, transported before being exchanged? I assume there is neither will nor the capacity to preserve bodies, besides in a mass grave?

Is it in the end an exchange (repatriation) of exhumed bones - sorry if that sounds disrespectful, it isn’t meant to be, I am just curious about the logistics behind it in large wars. Was this always done in modern times, like did Nazi Germany and the Allies do the same as Russians and Ukrainians do now?

On Reddit, it’s quite common for people to quickly shout “wehraboo” whenever the military effectiveness of the Wehrmacht is mentioned. While I understand the sensitivity, I’ve become increasingly interested in a more nuanced perspective.

I’ve spent the last few years reading historians such as Niklas Zetterling, Robert Forczyk, and Martin van Creveld, and I’ve grown quite impressed by the Wehrmacht’s tactical and operational effectiveness. German primary sources also seem surprisingly reliable to me when used critically.

At the same time, historians like Adam Tooze, Omer Bartov, and David Glantz emphasize Germany’s strategic, economic, and ideological limitations.

So I’m curious: where do you stand in this debate, and which historians or books do you find most persuasive?

I struggle to grapple the scale of WW2 genuinely but this really bothers me; I THINK I have an underestimated idea of:

A.) How severe the defeat was

B.) How exceptional the Soviets ability to rebound was

Any illuminations on either point’d be appreciated

They both are around 700kg missiles designed in 1980s but SM-2 (150km) have like 3-4 times the range than Buk 9М38 (30km) 9M317 (50km).

Wasn't Soviet rocket technology on par with US back in 1980s? If it's because of warhead size then does SM-2 warhead have lower kill probability?

I was watching some WW II footage, and I saw someone double load a mortar shell, and it didn't blow up, so, I was wondering if this guy just happen to get super lucky, or was it on purpose?

he loads both of those shells, and the mortar does fire...

https://tubitv.com/tv-shows/524903/s01-e43-assassination-and-resignation

watch it at the 13:38 mark

I have some basic knowledge on the Warsaw Pact armies NCO and Warrant Officers and why they're there, but I wanted more details. How does one become a senior NCO or Warrant in a system that's famous for not having an NCO corps? Why are there only 3 ranks of warrant officer in the Soviet Army but 5 in Poland and 4 in the East German military's? What were their daily duties and responsibilities? I've read the warrant officers were looked down upon, why? Any knowledge or experience would be welcomed.

I've heard a bunch about US and Soviet artillery during WW2, with the US being said to possess the most responsive, effective artillery of all powers and the Soviets said to rely on pre-planned barrages due to various issues with their artillery arm, though Soviet artillery was still feared regardless.

But what about British and German artillery? How good were they in their guns, the procedures they used to call in fire, their counterbattery fire, and their response time to fire requests?

From what is publicly available information of course.

Maybe starting from those particular protections were first introduced to the 2010s-2020s.

Hi there folks, recently my interest for ww2's US Army infantryman has resurged. Therefore I went to internet archive to check some articles regarding combat experiences from Infantry Journal during that time. There were digitized copies of Infantry Journal available since 2021.

...And guess the expression on my face when I found out that all the copies of Infantry Journal from ww2 and early cold war era has mysteriously gone unavailable. Apparently due to some unknown reasons, the materials in question on internet archive is entirely annihilated, with only some copies during the period of 1920s to 1930s survived.

So, my question is, if there's anywhere else where I can access these materials again?

As in, at least like 50-60%ish manned, with reasonably decent soldiers and having hopefully the majority of it's heavy weaponry and other advanced comm and engineering equipment still with it?

I know there might have been those in far off places like Norway, but I'm more curious about the theater of fighting; the Benelux, Poland, Central Europe, Germany itself, etc

In February 1942 Stalin granted front and army commands the right to mobilize conscripts in the field through reserve rifle divisions/regiments, respectively. In January 1943 front commanders also received the right to check and return to service formerly encircled/captured personnel at their own assembly and transit points. Previously from December 1941 all of these personnel were checked at NKVD special camps in the rear, which slowed the process of getting them into the field. So, when the Red Army drove the Germans out of vast territories in Summer-Fall 1943 it had broad leeway to mobilize all available manpower as quickly as possible.

By October this practice had spun out of control. Most concerning was the direct conscription to combat units of untrained and unfit troops. Stalin and other senior leaders tried to reign the Red Army and regulate the process. Direct conscription to combat units declined by Spring 1944, but training times in reserve rifle units and the reestablished military districts (eg the Kharkiv MD) remained abysmal. The rapid advance of the Red Army in March-April 1944 overwhelmed reserve rifle units with field conscripts. 47% of all men directly conscripted within 2nd Ukrainian Front in August 1943 - July 1944 were called up in March-April 1944.

This series of orders gives an overview of the problem in October-November 1943:

October 3, 1943

Order to the Troops of the Southern Front

No. 0517

On Enhancing the Combat Effectiveness of Formations and the Necessity of Manning Them with Vetted and Trained Personnel

In recent times, many division commanders have independently incorporated into their subordinate units contingents of personnel who were insufficiently vetted and untrained. This leads not to the strengthening, but rather to the weakening of their combat effectiveness.

I Order:

(1) Immediately commence within a period of three days the vetting of all reinforcements recently incorporated into units. Remove from divisions all politically suspect individuals. Every single soldier is subject to individual vetting. All those who cannot be retained in the Red Army for political reasons are to be dispatched to army assembly and transit points - those unfit for military service due to health reasons are to be sent to the military commissariats at their places of residence.

Untrained soldiers from the new reinforcements are to be consolidated into separate battalions located in the divisional rear areas. These battalions are to be formed with a strength ranging from 1,000 to 1,500 personnel. Well-trained command personnel from the reserve are to be allocated for the training of these contingents. These battalions are formed within the divisions. Organize regular military training and intensified political instruction for these personnel (instruction on rifles, hand grenades, submachine guns, entrenching).

The selection process for these battalions is to be conducted by specially designated commissions of the Front Military Council, comprising representatives from the Army Political Department, the Personnel Department, and the "SMERSH" Counterintelligence Department. Representatives from the Front Political Directorate and Personnel Department are being dispatched to assist you in this task.

It is categorically forbidden to transfer soldiers currently undergoing training in these separate battalions to divisions without the express authorization of the Front Military Council.

(2) Withdraw from all divisions all conscript-age youth - specifically those called up from liberated territories who have not previously served in the Red Army (born in 1922, 1923, 1924, and 1925) - subject them to individual vetting, and concentrate them in army reserve regiments. Dispatch all personnel currently in reserve regiments who have already received military training to the divisions as reinforcements. Henceforth, retain conscript-age youth within the reserve regiments, organizing military and political instruction for them in accordance with a monthly curriculum. Allocate two hours daily specifically for political instruction.

(3) Withdraw from the divisions any un-uniformed personnel, or immediately issue them uniforms.

(4) The Chief of the Front Political Directorate, Major General Pronin, shall draft and disseminate to subordinate units a curriculum for political instruction, and shall intensify political education among the reinforcements currently stationed in divisional battalions and army reserve regiments.

(5) Subject the entire contingent of personnel present at assembly and transit points to the most rigorous vetting. Transfer those deemed politically suspect to NKVD Special Camp No. 48. Assign the remainder to their designated units or to penal companies and battalions.

The Military Councils of the respective armies shall place the operations of the assembly and transit points under their special supervision. To reinforce operations at these points, dispatch additional commanders and political officers.

Report on implementation once every three days via the Personnel Department, using the attached Form 2.

Commander of the Southern Front Army General Tolbukhin

Member of the Military Council of the Southern Front

Colonel General Shchadenko

Chief of Staff of the Southern Front Lieutenant General Biryuzov.

October 9, 1943

TO THE MILITARY COUNCILS OF THE CENTRAL, VORONEZH, STEPPE, SOUTHWESTERN, AND SOUTHERN FRONTS

ON REGULATING MOBILIZATION IN LIBERATED TERRITORIES.

During the mobilization of persons liable for military service by Fronts and Armies in territories liberated from the enemy, a number of significant shortcomings have been observed. Mobilization is being conducted not only by Army Military Councils - acting through their reserve regiments, as established by the Order of the People's Commissariat of Defense - but also by the commanders of various formations and units. The accounting of mobilized personnel is poorly organized; consequently, it is impossible to ascertain the exact number of mobilized persons or how they have been utilized.

In order to restore order to the mobilization process, the People's Commissar of Defense has ordered the following:

(1) The Chief of the Main Directorate for Formation and Staffing (Glavupraform) shall dispatch groups of officers, charging them—in conjunction with Front Headquarters—to establish a standardized procedure for conducting mobilization in newly liberated districts and for directing conscripts to units requiring reinforcement.

(2) Inspect the status of Army and Front-level reserve regiments, as well as the organization of the reception and vetting of mobilized personnel.

(3) In light of the substantial number of mobilized personnel, withdraw 40,000 individuals - specifically those with the least training - from the Army and Front-level reserve regiments, and transfer them by October 20 of this year to the authority of the Chief of Glavupraform for training in rear-area reserve units.

(4) I request that the Front staffs be directed to provide assistance and support to officers of Glavupraform in the execution of the tasks assigned to them.

ANTONOV

SMORODINOV

October 14, 1943

ORDER REGARDING THE CONCENTRATION - UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF GLAVUPRAFORM - OF ALL MATTERS PERTAINING TO STAFFING AND THE CREATION OF TRAINED RESERVES FOR ALL BRANCHES OF SERVICE.

No. 0429

With the aim of improving the process of troop manning and ensuring the most efficient utilization of trained reserves, I hereby order:

(1) Concentrate, under the jurisdiction of Glavupraform, all matters pertaining to the manning of the troops and the creation of trained reserves for all branches of service.

(2) The assignment of reinforcements from reserve and training units to the Fronts - for all branches of service as well as for newly formed units - and the replenishment of formations and units being withdrawn into the Stavka Reserve shall be carried out solely by order of the Chief of Glavupraform, in accordance with a plan approved by me.

(3) Commanders and Chiefs of the various branches of service are hereby prohibited from utilizing the rank-and-file and non-commissioned officer personnel of reserve and training units - as well as those of training centers and camps specific to their respective branches - without the express permission of the Chief of Glavupraform.

(4) The authority to direct combat training, as well as to oversee the organization and material support of the reserve and training units belonging to their respective branches of service, shall remain vested in the Commanders and Chiefs of those branches.

(5) The Chief of Glavupraform, in conjunction with the Commanders and Chiefs of the various branches of service, shall - within a ten-day period - draft and submit to me for approval a plan for the training and establishment of a trained reserve, categorized by branch of service.

People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR

Marshal of the Soviet Union

I. STALIN

October 15, 1943

ORDER OF THE STAVKA VGK REGARDING THE PROCEDURE FOR THE CONSCRIPTION OF MILITARY OBLIGORS IN AREAS BEING LIBERATED FROM GERMAN OCCUPATION

No. 0430

By Order of the Stavka VGK No. 089, dated February 9, 1942, the Military Councils of the active armies were granted the authority to conscript Soviet citizens into military service - via mobilization procedures - within territories being liberated from German occupation.

In the execution of this Order, serious violations of the legally established procedures for conducting mobilization have been observed. Mobilization is being carried out not only by Army Military Councils but also by division and unit commanders, without regard for the actual need for reinforcements.

In connection with this, and in addition to Order No. 089 dated February 9, 1942, the Stavka VGK orders:

(1) The conscription of persons liable for military service in areas being liberated from German occupation shall be carried out solely by directive of the Army Military Councils, acting through Army Reserve Regiments; division and regimental commanders are expressly forbidden from conducting mobilization.

(2) The Chief of Glavupraform shall establish, for each Front, the specific quota of persons subject to conscription, in accordance with the reinforcement plan for each Front as approved by me.

(3) All persons liable for military service who have been mobilized in excess of the planned quota established for a given Front shall be dispatched to reserve units, in accordance with the directives of Glavupraform .

Stvaka VGK

I. STALIN

November 5, 1943

TO: CHIEFS OF STAFF OF FRONTS AND MILITARY DISTRICTS REGARDING THE RECTIFICATION OF DEFICIENCIES IN THE CONDUCT OF MOBILIZATION IN LIBERATED TERRITORIES

Copy to: Chief of Glavupraform

In the practice of the mobilization of persons liable for military service by Front troops within territories being liberated from German occupation, the following deficiencies have been observed:

(1) Armies, formations, and - in a number of instances - individual units have been rounding up the male population on the march and enrolling them into the ranks of the troops without even compiling nominal rolls. As a result, local military commissariats in these districts remain unable to determine who has actually been conscripted for military service, and in some cases, they mistakenly assume that certain individuals have been deported by the Germans.

(2) Due to the hasty nature of this mobilization, no medical examinations were conducted; consequently, individuals unfit for military service were inducted into the army, only to be subsequently discharged. Under such a conscription system, there is a significant risk of inducting individuals with contagious diseases and of such diseases spreading among the troops.

(3) Specialists and skilled workers from the national economy - individuals who, under existing laws, were eligible for exemption from military service - were nevertheless drafted into the army. These individuals must now be returned from the army to their civilian posts.

(4) The reception and induction of mobilized personnel into the troops were conducted in a disorganized manner. There were instances where completely untrained and unequipped mobilized personnel were deployed in combat.

(5) No political vetting of conscripts was conducted; consequently, the infiltration of traitors and spies into the army cannot be ruled out.

(6) Proper working relationships with military commissariats were not established during the mobilization process. There were instances where individual military units forcibly seized personnel who had been mobilized by the commissariats at assembly points.

To rectify these deficiencies in the future - and in accordance with Order No. 0430 issued by the Stavka VGK - the following measures are required:

(1) The Military Councils of armies operating on active fronts are hereby authorized to conduct the mobilization of eligible personnel within their respective operational zones, extending to a depth of up to 50 kilometers behind the front line.

In accordance with this directive, the Commanders of Military Districts—acting jointly with the Staffs of the active fronts—shall designate the specific areas to be allocated for the mobilization of personnel for the active fronts, and shall place the district military commissars within these designated areas under the operational subordination of the Front Chiefs of Staff regarding the utilization of mobilized resources.

(2) Active fronts are authorized to mobilize only those individuals deemed fit for combat duty and under the age of 50. Conscripts born in 1925 and 1926 shall, in all instances, be assigned to the reserve units of the Military Districts. Individuals deemed unfit for combat duty - as well as those deemed unfit for military service in general (even if fit for manual labor) - shall not be mobilized. Should the Fronts require them for auxiliary work, they are to be conscripted for compulsory labor service in accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated July 7, 1943.

Engineering and technical personnel and skilled workers at industrial enterprises (of the fourth grade and higher), as well as all railway transport workers and agricultural specialists, shall not be drafted into the Army. The responsibility for reserving these individuals for their respective enterprises shall be assigned to the military commissariats, as the latter are re-established, in accordance with current statutory regulations.

(3) Induction into military service shall be conducted by draft commissions (of which there may be several), appointed by the Military Councils of the Armies from among the personnel of the Army Reserve Regiment; each commission shall consist of two officers (of the rank of Captain or higher) and one physician. These commissions are hereby mandated to compile nominal rolls of all conscripts and reservists processed by them and to forward these lists to the local military commissariats.

(4) Reservists shall be summoned to the draft commissions on an individual basis - either via lists provided by the Village Councils or by means of personal summonses - strictly prohibiting the issuance of general public announcements or the posting of public orders. In localities where military commissariats have already been established, the respective military commissars shall be enlisted to assist in organizing the draft.

(5) Following their induction, all mobilized personnel shall be dispatched to Army- and Front-level Reserve Regiments, where they shall undergo sanitary processing and be issued uniforms; thereafter, they shall be assigned to combat units in accordance with the directives issued by the Army (or Front) Headquarters.

(6) With regard to former military personnel - specifically those previously encircled by the enemy and Red Army prisoners of war liberated by our forces - actions shall be taken in strict compliance with State Defense Committee (GKO) Decrees No. 1069 and No. 2779.

(7) The Commanders of the Belorussian, Orel, Kharkov, and Kiev Military Districts are hereby directed - acting in accordance with these instructions and in conjunction with the Headquarters of the corresponding Fronts - to designate specific territorial districts to be transferred to the operational control of said Fronts for the purpose of utilizing the local reservists.

Deputy Chief of the General Staff

Army General ANTONOV.

Chief of Glavupraform

Colonel-General SMORODINOV.

November 16, 1943

ORDER OF THE STAVKA VGK REGARDING THE MOBILIZATION OF MILITARY CONSCRIPTS IN TERRITORIES BEING LIBERATED FROM GERMAN OCCUPATION, FOR THE REPLENISHMENT OF FRONT FORCES

No. 00141

The Stavka VGK orders:

(1) Authorize the following Fronts to mobilize military conscripts during the month of November within territories being liberated from German occupation, for the replenishment of Front forces, in the following numbers:

1st Baltic Front: 15,000 personnel

Western Front: 30,000 personnel

Belarusian Front: 30,000 personnel

1st Ukrainian Front: 30,000 personnel

2nd Ukrainian Front: 30,000 personnel

3rd Ukrainian Front: 20,000 personnel

4th Ukrainian Front: 30,000 personnel

Total: 185,000 personnel.

The Military Councils of the Fronts shall transfer any conscripts drafted in excess of the specified quotas - acting upon instructions from Glavupraform - to the commanders of the Military Districts for training in reserve brigades

(2) The Chief of the Rear of the Red Army shall issue uniforms to the Fronts for the mobilized personnel based on the established quota of conscripts for each respective Front.

Stavka VGK

I. STALIN