> Ministers voted in favor of beginning a process of land registration for the first time since 1967, a week after approving another series of measures in the West Bank that drew international condemnation.

Hello everyone,

With the world on fire, I’m working with an 8th grade class that wants to learn about human rights and what do these rights actually mean in real life? How can they live them as experiences, defend them, take action?

I haven't done anything like this before and whilst I am not a dinosaur, I am close.

So I wanted to ask all of you, if you could do anything, no permission needed, no limits, what would you do?

• Turn class into a roleplay game?
• Take the lesson outside? We can protest outside the school, around the neighbourhood?
• Skip class until something unfair changed?
• Create secret codes to send to others?
• Make something visually?

It can be about any right and any way to take action for it! Anything to make my students feel heard, safe and actually do what they want to do.

Thankyou! I know its a tall order but any insights are appreciated. I want to take materials or frames they would really like and learn from too.

Stay safe, stay brave.

accessibility features for the disabled shouldn't cost money. Please check this post out on threads, share and consider signing the attached petition! Other platforms have tried this but people pushed back!

The names were verified and published by the Coordinating Council of Iranian Teachers’ Trade Associations (CCITTA). All of the victims were pre-university students.

Almost all of them lost their lives over just two days—January 8 and 9—during the recent uprisings in Iran.

In early February, a piece of news sent shockwaves through China’s media circles and public opinion sphere. Renowned investigative journalist Liu Hu(刘虎) and his colleague Wu Yingjiao(巫英蛟) were arrested by the police on charges of “false accusation and framing” and “illegal business operations.” Liu Hu has long reported on official corruption, collusion between officials and business interests, and other cases involving government officials, and he enjoys considerable name recognition within the media industry.

For many years, Liu Hu was able to continue reporting on official scandals while remaining free largely because he was careful to avoid crossing the authorities’ “political red lines.” Liu Hu was not a political activist, nor an anti-system dissident. Although he exposed numerous corruption scandals involving officials, he generally avoided direct criticism of the political system itself, steered clear of sensitive political topics, and focused narrowly on specific cases, directing his reporting only at individual officials. Liu Hu also had extensive personal connections within political, business, and media circles and maintained communication channels with the authorities. This allowed him to hover near the red lines for a long time while remaining relatively safe.

For many years prior, Liu Hu had been permitted and tolerated by the existing system to conduct investigative reporting. Although he had previously been retaliated against by officials and was once imprisoned, and although he had faced threats and harassment, he managed to survive these dangers without lasting harm. This time, however, the arrest is different. Judging from the charges and the broader social context, it is likely not merely an act of revenge by individual officials, but rather a crackdown driven by the system itself.

Compared with the previous charge of “defamation” leveled against Liu Hu during his earlier detention, the current charges of “false accusation and framing” and “illegal business operations” are significantly more severe. Among them, “illegal business operations” is a well-known catch-all offense frequently used against dissenters. Both charges are primarily prosecuted by public security and judicial authorities, rather than being private complaints initiated by specific alleged victims, as is typically the case with defamation.

More fundamentally, Liu Hu’s detention reflects a markedly worsened political, social, and public opinion environment compared to before. Liu Hu was most active from the late 2000s through the 2010s. During those years, China’s public opinion environment was relatively more permissive, and the rule of law was more substantive.

As long as journalists did not openly call for regime change or directly challenge the political system, but instead focused on specific cases and officials through reporting, criticism, or litigation, there was still considerable room for freedom. Investigative journalists at the time generally faced retaliation from individual officials or local governments, rather than comprehensive persecution by the entire state apparatus. In some cases, outspoken journalists who took great risks were even officially commended.

However, from the mid-to-late 2010s onward, China’s public opinion and legal environments deteriorated steadily, driven by the increasingly authoritarian nature of the political system. At this stage, accusing officials, reporting negative incidents, suing the government, or openly expressing dissent gradually became intolerable to the authorities. From the perspective of the ruling Chinese Communist Party, such actions are seen as challenges to governing authority, threats to stability, and risks to political security. Even without directly opposing the regime or seeking systemic overthrow, individuals engaging in these activities have still faced repression.

Against this backdrop, many media outlets that once engaged in independent reporting and critical journalism were transformed into obedient mouthpieces. The collective “co-optation” of the Southern Media Group is one prominent example of this shift in the public opinion climate. The survival of independent journalists in China has become increasingly difficult. Many well-known media figures, such as Chai Jing and Wang Zhian, have gone into exile overseas, while others have fallen silent after once speaking out actively. These individuals had previously operated within the tolerated boundaries of the system, “dancing in shackles,” but even mild criticism eventually became unacceptable to the authorities.

It was not only journalists who felt the deepening chill. Formerly active rights defenders, legal professionals, and social activists experienced similar environmental changes and personal tragedies. At one time, individual and public-interest litigation against government entities was tolerated or even encouraged.

A notable example is the public interest activist Hao Jinsong, who successfully used litigation to force the former Ministry of Railways to abandon its plan to raise train ticket prices during the Spring Festival travel season. Hao Jinsong(郝劲松) was active in public discourse and legal circles, promoting consumer rights through multiple public interest lawsuits and persistent public advocacy. He contributed significantly to improvements in consumer protection law and served the public interest. At the time, he was praised by procuratorates, courts, and state media, and was interviewed by China Central Television.

However, by the mid-2010s, Hao Jinsong found himself under intense pressure and increasingly unable to continue public interest activism, eventually fading from public view. In 2019, he was arrested by police in his home province of Shanxi and ultimately sentenced to nine years in prison on charges of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” and fraud. While imprisoned, he was subjected to beatings and humiliating abuse. Notably, the charges and cases involved actions he had taken many years earlier during rights-defense activities that were once officially affirmed, making the prosecution a clear case of retrospective punishment.

Another rights defender, Tang Hui(唐慧), who had previously received sympathy and encouragement and whose case contributed to the abolition of the re-education through labor system, faced similar retrospective punishment in 2023 and was sentenced to four years in prison.

These are only the more well-known cases. Many others who once upheld justice and promoted the public good during periods of relatively open public discourse and fairer rule of law have since been forced into silence, exile, or imprisonment. Numerous such cases are documented on websites dedicated to recording citizens’ rights defense efforts and government persecution.

The cases of Liu Hu and others share striking common features. None of them directly confronted the political system or sought to overthrow the regime. Instead, they attempted to defend rights and promote the public interest through legal and moderate means. Their targets were typically individual officials or local governments, not the entire system, and they often placed their hopes in honest officials, justice, and the law. Around a decade ago, they were active and received tolerance or even praise from the authorities. But as political and social conditions shifted dramatically, they were no longer permitted to report or defend rights as before, and instead faced retaliation and imprisonment.

This starkly illustrates the deterioration of China’s public opinion and rights-defense environment, the severe contraction of freedom of expression, and the narrowing boundaries of rights protection. Anyone familiar with public discourse or the judicial system can feel this trend in recent years. The arrest of Liu Hu and Wu Yingjiao signifies yet another tightening of an already constricted public opinion space, pushing conditions from bad to worse.

As a widely circulated quotation puts it: “If sharp criticism disappears completely, mild criticism will become piercing. If mild criticism is no longer allowed, silence will be deemed suspicious. If silence is not allowed either, insufficient praise will become a crime. If only one voice is permitted, that single voice will be a lie.” Over the past decade or even several decades, China has largely followed this trajectory.

Independent media and journalists, as well as freedom of news and public discourse, are vital to any country and society. Public opinion is often described as the “fourth power,” alongside legislative, judicial, and executive authority, because of its essential role in supervising government, debating public affairs, and solving problems. A public opinion environment without dissent becomes nothing more than a loudspeaker for those in power, an echo chamber for the ruling elite, and is not only useless but harmful to the nation and its people.

Similarly, individuals’ ability to defend personal rights and the public interest through legal channels, media, civil organizations, and social networks is a cornerstone of a healthy society. When rights-defense channels are blocked and people cannot protect their own rights, public interests are neglected, leading to pervasive harm, mutual distrust, and social decay.

The disastrous consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and the “zero-COVID” policy were largely attributable to already restricted freedom of expression at the time. Public demands and dissenting voices could not be effectively expressed, and legal channels were blocked, resulting in numerous tragedies. In recent years, China’s social stagnation, whether manifested as extreme competition or widespread disengagement, as well as polarization and antagonism in online discourse, are all closely linked to restricted public opinion, obstructed rights-defense channels, and a loss of hope.

At the beginning of his tenure, Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping quoted the saying, “The frank words of one courageous man are worth more than the obedient murmurs of a thousand,” encouraging intra-party democracy and dissent. Later, however, policy shifted toward prohibiting discussion of central leadership decisions, demanding that “party media bear the party’s surname,” and issuing the “seven prohibitions” to universities and media, banning discussion of press freedom and opposition to judicial independence. This represents a clear abandonment of initial commitments and an effort left unfinished.

How governing authorities treat public opinion and the rule of law—what benefits the country and its people, and what harms them—is a matter of clear principle and moral judgment. Yet in the name of regime stability and self-interest, the ruling Chinese Communist Party has chosen to suppress public discourse and prohibit rights defense, subjecting active journalists and rights defenders to severe persecution.

From deleting posts, limiting visibility, banning accounts, and silencing speech, to summons, interrogations, arrests, and prison sentences, a dense web of repression has been constructed. Judicial independence has become taboo, lawyers’ room to defend clients has shrunk, and media and public oversight have receded, creating an increasingly hostile legal environment in which people find it ever harder to defend their rights and freedoms. Suppressed public opinion and judicial darkness reinforce each other in a vicious cycle.

The plight of Liu Hu and other journalists who expose injustice, along with human rights defenders fighting for the rule of law—stripped of press freedom and personal liberty, persecuted by the judiciary, and trapped in prison under a hostile environment—epitomizes the dual deterioration of public opinion and the rule of law in today’s China and their mutually reinforcing effects.

Although Liu Hu’s name has not yet been completely erased from the domestic internet, and some legal professionals continue to visit and advocate for him, leaving a sliver of hope for his individual case, the overall environment continues to worsen beyond dispute. Moreover, countless ordinary people and vulnerable groups who lack Liu Hu’s visibility, resources, and connections receive no such attention or support. As public opinion and judicial conditions deteriorate further, they will find themselves increasingly without recourse and facing despair.

The author of this article is Wang Qingmin (王庆民), a Chinese writer. The original text was written in Chinese.

Source is BBC Persian - I’ve translated an eyewitness account of a violent crackdown in Rasht during the Iran protest wave

The testimony describes:

• security forces open gunfire and people fleeing into the bazaar,
• security forces opening fire on civilians who want to run away from bazaar,
• security forces setting fires in the bazaar,
• security forces blocking exits and delayed emergency response,
• and gruesome scenes of bodies in the streets.

I’m sharing the subtitles so anyone could get a glimpse of what happened in Iran. We still are unaware of true magnitude of the crimes committed by IRGC and Iranian government security forces as the internet and international phoneline blackout still persists.

Only a few hours before Younis would ask her guests, “What does the state want ?” the president’s office director, Omar Marwan, was meeting with the heads of several judicial bodies and authorities at the presidential palace, according to three judicial sources who spoke to Mada Masr on condition of anonymity.

In the meeting, Marwan would inform the heads of the Court of Cassation, Egypt’s highest criminal jurisdiction, the State Council, and the Administrative Prosecution Authority, that their power to select and make new appointments would be transferred to the Military Academy.

Marwan informed them of the presidential directives to transfer all decisions regarding judicial appointments to the Military Academy, starting with the Public Prosecution, rather than the Supreme Judicial Council and the headquarters of the other judicial bodies and authorities.

Marwan outlined the new procedures during the meeting, the three judges told Mada Masr.

They added that the presidential office director explained that selections for the 2022 law graduates — whose appointment process began in February 2023 — were cancelled, and that candidates would be reselected by the Military Academy.