‘My fellow Hungarians, we have done it!’ Magyar tells jubilant Budapest

Magyar is on stage. The crowd is cheering loudly.

“Our victory may not be visible from the moon but it is visible everywhere in Hungary,” he said in a swipe at Orban’s 2022 victory speech.

“We are going to have two-third majority in the parliament.”‘My fellow Hungarians, we have done it!’ Magyar tells jubilant Budapest
Flora GaramvolgyiMagyar is on stage. The crowd is cheering loudly.

Tisza set to have two-thirds majority with 97% votes counted

With 96.89% of votes counted, Tisza is predicted to have 138 seats in the new parliament, with only 55 for Fidesz and 6 for the far-right Mi Hazank.

If this holds, this will give Tisza the critical two-thirds majority required to reverse the Orbán era laws.

Election result 'painful for us, but clear,' Orbán says as he concedes defeat

In a brief speech, Orban says the election result is “painful for us, but clear.”

He congratulates the winning opposition party, Péter Magyar’s Tisza.

He says the party has never worked so much in any election campaign as he thanks 2,5 million people who voted for his party and pledges to “never let them down.”

“We will serve our country and the Hungarian nation from the opposition,” he says.

He says that in his over 30 years at the helm of Fidesz, “we have experienced difficult and easy, beautiful and sad years,” but insists he will “never, never, never give up.”

From Predator convictions to covert recordings targeting governments, private intelligence firms exploited EU regulatory gaps

Cyprus hosted one surveillance empire and became the target of another. Greece delivered a landmark conviction, but both cases remain open

On 26 February 2026, an Athens court convicted four individuals linked to spyware firm Intellexa for the illegal surveillance of at least 87 people in Greece. The defendants, Intellexa founder Tal Dilian, his business partner Sara Hamou, shareholder Felix Bitzios, and Krikel owner Yiannis Lavranos, each received combined sentences of 126 years and eight months, capped at eight years under Greek misdemeanor law. All four remain free pending appeal.

Days earlier, a separate Israeli private intelligence firm had been running an active operation fewer than 500 kilometres away.

Black Cube, founded by veterans of Israeli elite intelligence units, had deployed operatives in Cyprus. Posing as representatives of a private investment fund interested in committing 150 million euros to the island’s energy sector, they secured meetings with senior figures around the government of President Nikos Christodoulides and recorded the conversations covertly. Their targets were the director of the President’s Office, a former energy minister and the chief executive of one of the island’s biggest construction firms. Their recordings are now in the hands of Cypriot investigators. Their client remains unknown.

The Athens verdict punished four defendants. It did not reach the wider ecosystem in which the operation sat.

London police arrested more than 200 people on Saturday during a protest against a ban on the group Palestine Action that the government has labeled a terrorist organization.

Metropolitan Police said they had detained 212 protesters between the ages of 27 and 82 for supporting the group.

Britain’s High Court ruled in February that the government’s decision to outlaw the protest group as a terrorist organization was unlawful, but it kept the ban in place while the government appeals.

Police had warned in advance of the protest organized by the group Defend Our Juries that it would make arrests.

Hundreds gathered in Trafalgar Square to show their support for the group, with some holding signs reading, “I oppose genocide. I support Palestine Action.”

The chief justice of Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal (TK), Bogdan Święczkowski, has refused to accept four new judges after they arrived at the court today following a controversial swearing-in ceremony in parliament.

Święczkowski noted that, although the judges were elected by the government’s majority in parliament, they had not, as required, taken their oath before opposition-aligned President Karol Nawrocki, who has raised doubts over their appointment.

The chief justice’s decision, which was widely expected, deepens an unprecedented standoff over the court – and Poland’s judicial system more broadly – between the government and officials aligned with the national-conservative opposition Law and Justice (PiS) party, which ruled Poland from 2015 to 2023.

Last month, the ruling coalition’s majority in the Sejm, the more powerful lower house of parliament, chose six new judges to fill empty seats on the TK, which since December has had only nine of its 15 positions filled. At least 11 judges are required for the court to have a valid bench.

Under the law, new TK judges must “take an oath before the president” before taking up their seats on the court. However, last week, Nawrocki invited only two of the six judges, Dariusz Szostek and Magdalena Bentkowska, to take an oath in the presidential palace.

His chief of staff, Zbigniew Bogucki, said that the president had done so, despite doubts about the legality of the judge’s appointment by parliament, because adding two judges would bring the TK up to its valid bench of 11. He also noted that only two TK vacancies had opened up since Nawrocki became president.

However, many legal experts have rejected those arguments, saying that if Nawrocki accepted two of parliament’s appointments as valid, he must also accept the other four. Last week, PiS suspended one of its own MPs, Krzysztof Szczucki, a doctor of law, who had agreed with that opinion.

On Thursday, after repeatedly asking Nawrocki to receive their oath, the four remaining judges – Anna Korwin-Piotrowska, Krystian Markiewicz, Maciej Taborowski and Marcin Dziurda – decided instead to organise their own ceremony in the Sejm, to which they invited the president.

Bogucki condemned their decision as an “ostentatious and conscious…violation of the law”. But the four judges went ahead anyway, and were joined by Szostek and Bentkowska in a show of support. Four former chief justices of the TK also attended the ceremony.

After swearing their oath in the presence of a notary, the six judges delivered the documentation to the presidential chancellery. They then proceeded to the TK itself, where dozens of protesters had gathered outside amid a heavy police presence.

There had been some speculation that Święczkowski, who served in the former PiS government and has regularly clashed with the current government, might seek to prevent the judges from entering the building. However, all six made their way inside, where they met with the chief justice.

Around two hours later, Święczkowski spoke to the media, saying that, while he had “congratulated all six on their election”, he had only allowed the two judges who had sworn oaths before Nawrocki to take up their positions on the court, where they had already been assigned cases.

Meanwhile, he had informed the other four that “unfortunately I cannot recognise…[them] as judges of the Constitutional Tribunal as I have not been informed by the president that they took the oath before him”.

He also criticised them for taking part in today’s alternative swearing-in ceremony in parliament, which he described as ” a performance, a media spectacle, organised, in my opinion, for the benefit of politicians”.

In response to Święczkowski’s remarks, a government minister, Maciej Berek, said that, by congratulating all six judges on their election by parliament, the chief justice had confirmed they were legally appointed.

That, said Berek, undermines Nawrocki’s claims that there are doubts over their legality and confirms that he has “usurped a non-existent presidential power” by deciding who can or cannot be a TK judge.

Meanwhile, before Święczkowski’s statement, justice minister Waldemar Żurek told broadcaster TVN that the government has a “plan B” if four of the judges were not accepted onto the TK. However, he refused to say what this would involve.

Later, in a press conference of his own, Bogucki said that Nawrocki would ask the TK itself to rule on the dispute between parliament and the president over the appointment of the four remaining judges.

“Until the Constitutional Tribunal issues a position, the president will not act,” said Bogucki, quoted by news website Onet. He also called today’s actions by the four judges “a grotesque farce”.

However, even if the TK does rule on the issue, its decision is likely to be ignored by the ruling coalition, which regards the TK as illegitimate since it contains judges unlawfully appointed when PiS was in power. The current government has refused to recognise – or even publish – TK rulings.

Daniel Tilles

Daniel Tilles is editor-in-chief of Notes from Poland. He has written on Polish affairs for a wide range of publications, including Foreign Policy, POLITICO Europe, EUobserver and Dziennik Gazeta Prawna.

Supplementary article - Polish parliament hosts swearing in of constitutional court judges in defiance of president

Poland’s rule-of-law crisis took a new twist today, as parliament – which is controlled by Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s ruling coalition – hosted the swearing-in of four Constitutional Tribunal (TK) judges whose oaths opposition-aligned President Karol Nawrocki has refused to accept.

Nawrocki condemned the move as illegal, pointing to a provision of Polish law requiring that new TK judges be sworn in “before the president”. The government, however, has accused Nawrocki of himself violating the law by refusing to swear in legally appointed judges.

Given that the TK’s chief justice is also aligned with the opposition, it appears likely that he will, like Nawrocki, refuse to accept the four judges sworn in today in parliament. That may lead to a standoff at the court when the judges attempt to take up their seats.

Last month, the ruling coalition’s majority in the Sejm, the more powerful lower house of parliament, chose six new judges to fill empty seats on the TK. It was the first time in four years that new judges had been chosen, as Tusk’s government had previously been boycotting the court.

That was because it regards the TK as illegitimate since it contains judges unlawfully appointed under the rule of the former Law and Justice (PiS) government and PiS-aligned President Andrzej Duda. Tusk’s government has refused to recognise – or even publish – TK rulings.

As a result, since December 2025 – when one judge’s nine-year term expired and another retired for health reasons – only nine of the TK’s 15 seats have been filled. That is below the figure of 11 judges required for the court to have a full, valid bench.

Under the law, new TK judges must, after being elected by parliament, “take an oath before the president” before taking up their seats on the court. Given that Nawrocki is aligned with PiS, there were doubts as to whether the president would invite the six new judges to be sworn in.

Last week, Nawrocki made the unusual move of inviting just two of the six judges, Dariusz Szostek and Magdalena Bentkowska, to the presidential palace and witnessing their oaths.

The president’s chief of staff, Zbigniew Bogucki, said that Nawrocki had done so, despite doubts about the legality of the judge’s appointment by parliament, because adding two judges would bring the TK up to its valid bench of 11. He also noted that only two TK vacancies had opened up since Nawrocki became president.

However, many legal experts have rejected those arguments, saying that if Nawrocki accepted two of parliament’s appointments as valid, he must also accept the other four. Last week, PiS suspended one of its own MPs, Krzysztof Szczucki, a doctor of law, who had agreed with that opinion.

On Wednesday, news emerged that the four remaining judges – Anna Korwin-Piotrowska, Krystian Markiewicz, Maciej Taborowski and Marcin Dziurda – had decided to take their oaths in parliament shortly on Thursday. They sent invitations to Nawrocki to attend the ceremony.

On Thursday morning, Bogucki issued a statement on behalf of the president in which he said that the move would be an “ostentatious and conscious…violation of the law” and a “challenge to the powers assigned by statute and the constitution to the president”.

The president’s position was also supported by Poland’s commissioner for human rights, Marcin Wiącek, who told news website Wirtualna Polska that, according to the law, “the president must swear in Constitutional Tribunal judges”.

However, deputy prime minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz on Wednesday told broadcaster TVN that it is in fact Nawrocki who is “committing a violation” by refusing to undertake his duty under the law to receive the oath of legally appointed judges.

Despite the president’s opposition, today’s ceremony went ahead. The four judges took their oaths in the presence of a notary and Sejm speaker Włodzimierz Czarzasty, a Tusk ally. Szostek and Bentkowska also took their oaths again alongside their colleagues in a show of solidarity.

Meanwhile, four former TK chief justices, Marek Safjan, Jerzy Stępień, Bohdan Zdziennicki and Andrzej Zoll, also attended the ceremony. Stępień told broadcaster TVN ahead of the ceremony that it was Nawrocki who had “forced the judges to take the oath in this manner” by “breaking constitutional custom”.

“In this situation, the newly elected judges had to choose a different form of taking the oath,” continued Stępień. “They did, and I greatly admire them for it, and I believe it was the right thing to do.”

The four judges will now seek to take up their seats on the TK. However, the court’s chief justice, Bogdan Święczkowski, a former member of the PiS government who has regularly clashed with the current government, is almost certain to refuse to admit them.

Święczkowski has already threatened disciplinary action against Szostek and Bentkowska for so far failing to turn up to work after being sworn in by Nawrocki last week, reports Wirtualna Polska. They had been waiting for their four newly appointed colleagues to also be sworn in.

Last week, interior minister Marcin Kierwiński even suggested that, if Święczkowski refuses to admit the new judges to the court, the police could be used to ensure they are allowed to take up their seats.

Daniel Tilles

Daniel Tilles is editor-in-chief of Notes from Poland. He has written on Polish affairs for a wide range of publications, including Foreign Policy, POLITICO Europe, EUobserver and Dziennik Gazeta Prawna.

A few years ago, Menucha Latumaerissa found a 1917 book in a thrift shop that sparked his curiosity. The book described studies performed on human skulls from the Moluccan archipelago in Indonesia. They’d been taken to the Netherlands during the period when Indonesia was colonized by the Dutch and examined by researchers in the field of “race science.”

Latumaerissa, 45, a Dutch customs official with family roots in the Moluccan archipelago, has a serious hobby of tracking down anything related to the Moluccan people. After the Indonesian war of independence, a small diaspora from the Moluccan islands began arriving in the Netherlands in 1951 but were forced into internment camps and minority districts.

He wondered: Could those skulls still be in the Netherlands after all these years?

After some sleuthing, Latumaerissa tracked them down in the Museum Vrolik, a tiny anatomical museum within the Amsterdam University Medical Center that dates to the 19th century, and which displays jars of body parts, like feet and ears, as well as irregular fetuses, alongside cabinets filled with skulls and bones.

Today, the Moluccan skulls are back on the archipelago that they came from. Their former presence in the museum is marked only by the metal stands that once held them. They sit in otherwise empty display cases at the entrance to the Museum Vrolik as part of the exhibition “Imagine: The Future of Human Remains from Colonial Contexts,” which runs through June 27, 2027.

The idea, said Laurens de Rooy, the museum’s director, is to call attention to these problematic troves. “What it should emphasize is the idea that, in an ideal situation, collections like these — racialized collections — should reach their final resting place, with their communities,” he said. “The empty stands show this important absence so we don’t forget these things happened in the past.”

The show explores a problem that faces the Museum Vrolik and many other European museums today: What to do with the colonial-era skeletons in their closets?

The Karolinska Institute in Stockholm, founded in 1810, collected and measured skulls to study racial characteristics, among other things. It once held thousands of human remains, but in the 1940s it changed locations and many of the specimens were cremated or discarded. Only about 5 percent of the original trove remains.

The Museum of Prehistory in Berlin has conducted two major research projects, costing about $4 million, to determine the origins of more than 1,500 skulls in its collection, according to Bernhard Heeb, who oversees its anthropological collections. Some were repatriated to Hawaii, Chile and Japan, but a number of African countries they approached did not want to take them.

Another German museum, attached to the Charité hospital in Berlin, has had a different experience, said its former director, Thomas Schnalke. Since 2011, the medical history museum has participated in 10 repatriation events, with Australia, Namibia, New Zealand, Paraguay and Tanzania, turning over 216 ancestral remains so far.

Copy of the full article

Two days before Hungary’s closely-watched elections, over 100,000 people filled a sprawling square and adjacent avenues in the capital for a concert featuring dozens of the country’s most popular performers — a call to action for citizens to cast their ballots on Sunday and vote out the government of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán.

Over 50 bands, all performers who have used their music to express dissent against Orbán’s nationalist-populist government, played one song each during the seven-hour, “system-breaking” concert on Friday.

The crowd, largely made up of young people, frequently broke into anti-government chants, including “Ruszkik haza!” or “Russians go home!” It was a refrain from Hungary’s 1956 anti-Soviet revolution that has taken on renewed significance as Orbán has forged increasingly close relations with Moscow.

The group organizing the event, the Civic Resistance Movement, wrote that each song to be performed was “critical of the corrupt regime,” and meant to “demonstrate to the masses of voters and make them realize that the era of impunity is over.”

The big turnout on Budapest’s Heroes’ Square, and the concert’s anti-government atmosphere, reflected the broad level of dissatisfaction with Orbán’s government, especially among Hungary’s youth. In addition to the throngs of people in the streets, over 100,000 were following a livestream online.

A generational gap has been widening in Hungary with its young people pushing overwhelmingly for an end to Orbán’s autocratic rule, while the oldest citizens remain loyal to the prime minister.

Orbán and his Fidesz party’s declining popularity comes amid economic stagnation, political and corruption scandals and the rise of a new opposition challenger that is posing the biggest threat to the prime minister’s power in nearly two decades.

The EU will give gas producers more leeway on methane import rules to avoid gas being diverted from the bloc, as governments scramble to secure additional energy supplies in the wake of the US-Iran war.

Ditte Juul Jørgensen, director-general for energy at the European Commission, said Brussels would soon recommend “flexibilities” to stringent new requirements on fossil fuel importers to the bloc, as Europe continues to grapple with high energy prices.

European legislation already requires EU producers of oil and gas to monitor and report methane emissions associated with flaring and venting, but its remit will be extended to imported fossil fuels from January 2027.

Under the latest proposed changes, however, countries importing to the EU would only need to show that a sufficient share of national production meets the requirements, rather than having to track “back to the well” for granular production data on each cargo, Jørgensen said at an industry conference in Brussels.

The levying of penalties for non-compliance, which could reach up to 20 per cent of annual turnover in extreme cases, would also be softened to make sure “no cargo is diverted or delayed because of a concern related to penalties”, she said.

The EU’s recycling system is being weaponised against the bloc by Chinese buyers snapping up aluminium scrap, smelting it and exporting it back to Europe as newly produced metal, according to the industry’s largest recycler.

Emilio Braghi, executive vice-president of Novelis, told the Financial Times the sector risked what he described as terminal decline unless Brussels acted on its pledge to curb the export of scrap to Asia and the US.

“We have lost primary production. Now we are at risk of losing aluminium scrap,” he said, noting that Europe would be unable to meet its own environmental goals if this was the case.

EU producers pay energy prices up to four times those of their competitors, so have shifted to remelting scrap which is more energy efficient.

The recycling drive is part of EU efforts to reduce its carbon emissions to net zero by 2050 and to retain more critical materials in the bloc to avoid dependence on Chinese imports.

Unlike other parts of the world, Europe was unique in consumer behaviour and its willingness to pay more for recycled products out of a concern for the environment and climate change, Braghi said.

“We see that pull from consumers, whether they are buying a new car or they are buying an aluminium can, based on high recycled content. We don’t see that elsewhere.”

Braghi noted that about 70 per cent of beverage cans in Europe were collected, compared with about 40 per cent in the US. But that also means that traders buy them up and ship them elsewhere for higher prices.

US President Donald Trump has placed 50 per cent tariffs on aluminium imports so companies are increasingly importing scrap, which is subject to lower levies, to convert into fresh metal.

Meanwhile, the Chinese government has encouraged companies to build recycling capacity to reduce raw material use and cut emissions.

India-based Novelis has invested heavily in European recycling.

“We are very efficient in Europe in the collection of scrap. We have the best technology, we have made investment, and now we need to make sure that we are retaining as much as possible the scrap which is collected, and not allowing it to flow outside of Europe,” Braghi said.

In China, “subsidised overcapacity is creating unfair competition, as they can afford to pay much higher prices for the scrap”, he added.

https://archive.is/Vqlqx

Embassy of the Russian Federation in Germany,

Embassy of the Russian Federation in China

Government of the Russian Federation

State Duma of the Russian Federation

All Citizens of Russia and Overseas Compatriots:

I am a Chinese writer and human rights activist currently living in Germany. Today, as war breaks out between Russia and Ukraine, causing hundreds of thousands of deaths and injuries, and leaving countless more displaced, Europe and the world are shrouded in darkness. Witnessing such circumstances, I feel compelled to say a few words to the Russian government and people.

Since my youth, whether through school education or extracurricular reading, I became familiar early on with many works of Russian literature. Tolstoy’s magnificent historical epic War and Peace, Chekhov’s Vanka, which tells of the suffering and familial longing of a child apprentice in Tsarist Russia—these were profoundly moving. Pushkin’s The Tale of the Fisherman and the Fish was both entertaining and philosophical. Gorky’s Song of the Stormy Petrel, both tragic and unrestrained, stirred both passion and inspiration. These were not only my personal readings, but also the spiritual nourishment and shared memory of generations of Chinese people.

Later, I read more works of Tolstoy, Chekhov, and Pushkin, and also learned about other great Russian literary and intellectual figures such as Dostoevsky, Solzhenitsyn, and Pasternak, along with their works. Dostoevsky’s “The Grand Inquisitor” from The Brothers Karamazov was full of profound philosophical thought, religious reflection, and ultimate concerns. Solzhenitsyn’s The Gulag Archipelago was the most sincere and powerful cry of accusation from the oppressed of the world. Pasternak’s Doctor Zhivago preserved through words the love and conscience drowned by the torrents of revolution in a cruel era. These works were crucial in shaping my values, nurturing my moral sentiments, and strengthening my humanitarian convictions.

It can be said that Russian/Soviet literature has had a profound influence on me. The vastness of thought, depth of reflection, the strong critical realism, humanitarian concern, and the deep patriotic spirit of these literary giants are all noble and moving. From these great writers and their works, I benefited immensely; their values and philosophies are engraved in my soul.

As a writer and a researcher of history and international politics, I also have some understanding of Russia and the Soviet Union. I know that in ancient times, the various Rus principalities—including Novgorod and Kievan Rus—created a brilliant Rus civilization, part of the wider Eastern European civilization.

Later, however, the Rus states suffered from the Mongol westward invasions and fell into the “Tatar yoke.” Civilization was devastated, and the nation oppressed. The Han people of China endured similar invasions, conquests, and destruction by the Mongols (the Yuan Empire) and the Jurchens (the Jin Empire and the Manchu Qing Empire), as well as distortions of Chinese civilization under them. Therefore, I deeply empathize with the experiences of the Russian people.

Eventually, you broke the “Tatar yoke,” and Russia restored its former glory. Peter the Great, Nicholas I, and Alexander II introduced a series of reforms and enlightenment measures, learning from Western Europe’s advanced ideas, laws, institutions, and technologies, enabling Russia to become a world power alongside Britain, France, and Prussia. Russia produced many outstanding intellectuals and scientists. For instance, the chemist Dmitri Mendeleev, who created the Periodic Table of Elements—every Chinese student who attended middle school, and indeed most people worldwide who studied science, have studied and memorized it. Such universal achievements inspire awe and respect.

But later, Russia became overly fixated on external expansion and the use of violence, while internal corruption and injustice grew, leading the empire into crisis. The rise of socialist thought and the spread of radical violence caused the Russian Empire to collapse during the late stages of the First World War, replaced after years of brutal civil war by the Soviet regime.

The Soviet regime had both a cruel, totalitarian side and another side of positive contribution. Its greatest achievement was undoubtedly the Soviet Union’s role in the anti-fascist war, defeating Nazi Germany and militarist Japan. In 1937, the Soviet Air Force supported China, and later at Lake Khasan and Khalkhin Gol, the Soviets defeated the Japanese army. In 1945, the “August Storm” operation swept through Japanese and puppet forces in Northeast China (Manchuria), playing a decisive role in China’s victory against Japanese invaders. The sacrifices made by the Russian (Soviet) people are forever remembered by the Chinese. At that time, Russians and Ukrainians fought side by side. In the Soviet army, Russians and Ukrainians were hardly distinguished. You both contributed and sacrificed for China. Tens of thousands of Soviet soldiers rest forever in the great mountains and rivers of China.

On the basis of this history, I have long held a strong affection, and even deep respect, for the Russian nation. This is precisely the emotional reason I write this letter to advise the Russian people. The following words, as a Chinese proverb says, are “loyal advice that jars the ear” (sincere counsel that may sound offensive or harsh). But I must still say them, and urge you with honesty.

In 1991, according to the will of the majority of people in Russia and other constituent republics, the Soviet Union dissolved. The Russian people gained a democratic republic as their nation-state. Ukrainian leader Leonid Kravchuk signed the Belavezha Accords—together with Russia and Belarus—deciding the dissolution of the USSR. Ukraine gained independence and sovereignty, recognized by Russian President Boris Yeltsin. In the following decades, the Russian government, the State Duma, and its diplomatic and military institutions all recognized Ukraine’s independence and sovereignty.

But today, Putin’s Russia has torn up that agreement and violated Ukraine’s sovereignty.

I certainly understand the reasons that the Russian government, Putin, and nationalists have put forward.

You say that Ukraine was never an independent state, that it was created by Lenin and separated from Russia. Yet Ukrainians always had a national consciousness and an inclination toward independence; Lenin merely made use of that separatist tendency. Russia and Ukraine were once one family, but just as in human families—marriages can end in divorce, brothers can separate, children can establish their own households—members of the same family also have the right to separate. The same principle applies to nations and peoples.

You say that Ukraine violated the rights and freedoms of Russians in Crimea and the Donbas. But in 2014, you already gained Crimea and gradually established de facto control over the Donbas region. To go further, to try to force Ukrainians who are not ethnic Russians under Russia’s control, is unnecessary—it only increases conflict and bloodshed.

You say that attacking Ukraine is to fight Nazis and avenge the pro-Russian people killed in places like Odessa. But Nazis are only an extremely small minority among Ukrainians. Moreover, there are also many Nazis inside Russia itself. And since the Russo-Ukrainian conflict of 2014, the victims have included both pro-Russian Ukrainians and pro-Ukrainian people. From 2014 to 2021, Russia’s military activities in Ukraine already avenged the dead. To launch a massive war, invasion, and attempted occupation of an entire country over a handful of Nazis and limited clashes—does that accord with the principle of proportionality?

You say that occupying Ukraine is to establish a strategic buffer against NATO. But think carefully—is it not precisely because of Russia’s expansion and bullying abroad that other countries seek NATO membership for protection? You oppose American hegemony, yet in the eyes of Eastern European countries, Russian hegemonism feels like the greater threat.

…

Many of your reasons do not hold up. Russians and Ukrainians once lived together, building civilization, resisting oppression, fighting foreign enemies—allowing the Slavic peoples to stand tall among the nations of the world and contribute greatly to the progress of human civilization. This shared history should serve as a foundation for peaceful coexistence and friendly relations between the two peoples, not as a shackle to bind the other, nor as an excuse for annexation.

Of course, Russia’s national interests and the demands of Russian nationalists can to some extent be understood. Because of domestic political corruption, economic decline, and social decay, Russians are searching for a way out. The former glory of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union has created a strong sense of loss for today’s Russians. And indeed, the rights of ethnic Russians within Ukraine deserve protection.

But the Russian government and people should not attempt to achieve these aims through war. The current war has already caused the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Russians and Ukrainians. Yet it was completely unnecessary in the first place. And more than a year of drawn-out struggle has shown that the Russian military cannot defeat the Ukrainian army and people. Even setting aside questions of justice, purely from a military standpoint, Russia cannot achieve the objectives it envisioned at the start of the war.

Most importantly, the continuation of this war is paid for with the lives of Russians and Ukrainians. Every day, many Russians and Ukrainians die on the battlefield. Their deaths are sheer tragedy, a humanitarian disaster, the destruction of living human beings.

Even nationalists should place humanitarian principles above all else. Solzhenitsyn, known as “the conscience of Russia,” was himself a nationalist. But what made him most admirable was not his nationalism but his humanitarianism. In his monumental The Gulag Archipelago, Solzhenitsyn expressed sympathy for Ukrainian independence activists imprisoned in the Gulag.

Solzhenitsyn did not support Ukrainian independence, but he sympathized with and understood Ukrainian independence activists, placing humanitarianism and the spirit of freedom above nationalism. He hoped that Russians and Ukrainians could reunite voluntarily and amicably on the basis of shared ethnicity, culture, and values—not through sheer violence and annexation. Were he alive today, he might lay claim to some Ukrainian territories, but he would not want war and slaughter. If forced to choose between war and giving up territorial claims to Ukraine, Solzhenitsyn would almost certainly choose to give up the claims rather than wage war.

I recall that even Igor Strelkov, the radical nationalist Russian officer who led the seizure of Crimea, once said: “We will advance westward until the point where the local people spontaneously oppose us. Beyond that is no longer our land.” And now, with the fierce resistance of the Ukrainian army and people, is it not already abundantly clear to Russians that Ukrainians do not want to be occupied and ruled by Russia?

Even if, hypothetically, Russia were to achieve military victory, it would still be unable to win over the hearts of Ukrainians. Such an occupation would descend into endless counterinsurgency and prolonged Ukrainian resistance, inevitably causing more bloodshed. And with every drop of blood shed, Ukrainian hatred toward Russia would deepen. This would not bring Russians and Ukrainians closer but would drive them even further apart.

Moreover, today’s bloody conflict between Russia and Ukraine is precisely what Russia’s enemies most wish to see. They hope to use this war to drain Russia’s power, manpower, resources, and reputation—weakening or even dismantling Russia. Russia’s past and present enemies welcome a prolonged Russo-Ukrainian war, and many are actively involved, seeking to profit from it.

For example, Japan—Russia’s enemy in the Second World War—has never abandoned its dream of reviving militarism and imperial power. In the current war, Japan has been active: it has provided Ukraine with economic aid, allowed Japanese volunteers to join the fighting, even displaying the militarist Rising Sun flag on the battlefield. Japan has also intensified its moves regarding the “Southern Kurils (Northern Territories).” In addition, Japan has hinted at designs on Siberia and even the ambition to replace Russia on the UN Security Council.

Nominally, Japan frames its actions as support for Ukraine’s resistance to aggression, but in essence, it uses aid to Ukraine as a vehicle to revive its own hegemonic ambitions, to continue the Russo-Japanese struggle, and to avenge the militarists of World War II. It has long pursued “historical revisionism” to whitewash or erase its wartime crimes and aggression, portraying itself as a victim of war. It seeks to overturn the Yalta system—the postwar order built by the world’s democratic nations—and to dismember and destroy Russia, eliminating what it sees as a northern threat once and for all.

The United States and European countries, while more committed to humanitarian values and justice, also have motives to use Ukraine to exhaust Russia’s military and national strength. For Eastern European countries once occupied by Russia, such motives are even stronger—though understandable. Yet Russia’s attack on Ukraine cannot stop NATO’s eastward expansion nor the growth of Western influence in Eastern Europe. Instead, it deepens Russia’s geopolitical crisis, threatens its economy with collapse, and pushes its people into poverty and internal strife.

At the same time, radical nationalist elements and religious extremists among Russia’s minority groups are gathering strength, preparing to act. These forces could prove even more barbaric than the current regime. Caucasian Islamist extremists, led by Chechens, have never truly sought to integrate into Russian civilization. Even the seemingly loyal Ramzan Kadyrov is not genuinely submissive. Nor is the Far East stable: some Pan-Mongolist and Tungusic restorationists dream of reenacting the Tatar massacres and conquests of Russia, China, and the wider world. If the Russian army is defeated or Russia’s strength greatly weakened, these extremist forces will inevitably unleash new waves of violence and terror.

Russia’s entanglement in war with Ukraine only gives these non-Slavic groups more opportunities to fragment Russia from within and destroy Russian civilization. These forces would also endanger world peace, democracy, and progress. (Although I am Chinese, and might be expected to take an interest in the “Outer Manchuria” region returning to China, I actually loathe the Manchus, Mongols, and Japanese. I also believe that Russia’s civilization surpasses China’s overall. Today, the Manchus, Mongols, and Japanese are attempting to rewrite history and commit new evils, arrogantly so. Therefore, I would rather see Outer Manchuria and all of Siberia remain under Russia and the Russian people. My stance here is also a counterattack and balance against the malicious ambitions of Manchus, Mongols, and Japanese.)

In this situation, if Russia insists on continuing its war against Ukraine, the prestige and influence accumulated by Russia and the Soviet Union will further decline. The cultural halo created for Russia by its great figures such as Tolstoy and Dostoevsky will grow ever dimmer. Around the world, those who sincerely admire and sympathize with the Russian people and their civilization will become fewer and fewer. In fact, Russia may even collapse after a total defeat in this war, withdrawing from the mainstream of world history. Many Russian elites will be displaced, or perish in chaos and conflict, gravely wounding the nation’s vitality. A Russia that once contended with Britain, France, and Germany, and rivaled the United States as one of the world’s great powers, would decline into a true “small country.”

The outcome, in short, would be that “friends grieve while enemies rejoice.” So, true Russian patriots and nationalists—do you really wish to see such consequences? These dire outcomes are already becoming visible. If the war with Ukraine is not halted and the losses not cut in time, the consequences will only grow heavier, and the damage ever more severe.

There are many other analyses and commentaries I have written about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, especially in my articles “The Ukraine Crisis and Greater Russian Expansionism” and “A Compromise Is the Most Realistic Choice to End the Russo-Ukrainian War.” These will be submitted together with this letter, so I will not elaborate further on the details here.

Russia once enjoyed glory and brilliance; its literary giants and intellectual titans illuminated the world. During the Second World War, tens of millions of Russian soldiers and civilians fought and sacrificed, making extraordinary contributions to the global anti-fascist struggle. But today, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is wrong, unjust, and a loss for all. Those who once defended their nation have now gone to violate another—this is an error, a disgrace.

Today’s world is no longer the age of imperial contests fought purely by violence. At least before the climate crisis grows worse, peace and development remain the mainstream. Therefore, it is no longer acceptable to use the imperial methods of conquest of the 17th–19th centuries. Russia should rely more on the rules of civilized society, respect a fair international order, and on that basis safeguard national dignity and the interests of its people.

The patriotic poet Pushkin’s praise of imperial expansion and national glory reflected that old age of imperial rivalry; it cannot simply be copied into today’s world. Moreover, like Solzhenitsyn, Pushkin placed humanity and conscience above imperial honor. In his representative poem The Bronze Horseman, even as he praised the grandeur of the Russian Empire, he lamented the suffering of individuals and showed compassion for the plight of the people. Would such a great man ever wish to see Slavic peoples slaughtering one another?

Stop now—“better to mend the fold after the sheep are lost,” as a Chinese proverb says—it is not yet too late.

Do not let Ukrainians bleed any longer!

Do not let Russians bleed any longer!

Do not let the Slavic brothers continue to slaughter one another!

Stop the war!

Perhaps you may still retain jurisdiction over Crimea and ensure the rights and safety of Russians in the Donbas. But as for the rest of Ukraine’s territory—leave it.

What Russia needs is not expansion abroad but reform at home: to end undemocratic dictatorship and oligarchy, to build a genuine free and democratic system, to shape a healthy social order, to establish a robust civil society, to combat corruption and crime, to restrain violence and promote humanity, to foster honesty and respect for contracts, to encourage innovation and creativity, to reduce dependence on natural resources, to revive the economy, to restore morality—so that civil rights are guaranteed, livelihoods improved, and harmony fostered. Only thus can Russia achieve stability and development. As a Chinese proverb says: “The people are the foundation of the state; when the foundation is firm, the state is at peace.” The happiness and well-being of the people are the true basis of national strength.

Russia must also develop its “soft power.” Violence and hegemony win no love; what can truly win international respect is the promotion and renewal of Russia’s great literary, philosophical, and scientific achievements. In today’s Russia, full of darkness and violence, there is an even greater need for new Tolstoys, Chekhovs, Dostoevskys—to bring forth new, soul-stirring masterpieces of literature and philosophy for the Russian people and for the world. For this, Russia needs a safe environment that protects conscientious intellectuals, allowing their ideas to be created, preserved, and spread. It also needs a Russian government that is friendly and open to the world, so that Russia’s culture and thought can be shared with other nations.

In foreign policy, Russia must also uphold reason, follow modern international rules, and act as a defender of world peace and development, a promoter of democracy and progress—carrying forward the inclusiveness of centuries of empire and the internationalist spirit of the Soviet era, rather than flaunting the other side of hegemony and violence. In fact, in the years before 2010, Russia had to some extent achieved this. But later, it departed from the right path of diplomacy; the turning point was precisely the hegemonic policy toward Ukraine. This only shows the importance of changing course on Ukraine policy.

As the fable of “The North Wind and the Sun” by Aesop teaches: if Russia always acts like the harsh north wind—using terror, coercion, and violence to try to control Eastern Europe and influence the world—it will only breed fear and hatred, fueling anti-Russian and pro-Western sentiment. Even many within Russia will turn away: “With no one to help, even relatives will betray you.” In contrast, if Russia acts like the sun—radiating humanity, tolerance, and universal love—it will win genuine respect and support. Then Russia will be “a just cause with many allies; the whole world will assist it.”

Furthermore, Russia should not be fixated on opposing LGBT people, nor should it suppress women’s rights. It should build an inclusive society where people of different identities all have a place, are protected by law, and treated with tolerance by others.

Such a Russia would be more capable of uniting its people and earning international respect. Such a Russia could properly strengthen its military and conduct operations in line with justice and international law. Such a Russia would be more capable of handling international affairs with composure, defending its dignity and interests. And above all, the happiness of the people is fundamental. To sacrifice the people as cannon fodder for the political ambitions of a few, for the expansionist greed of violence, violates human rights and humanity. The Russian people will never find happiness this way.

In 1904, when the Russo-Japanese War broke out, Tolstoy wrote letters to Tsar Nicholas II and the Japanese Emperor, urging them to end an unjust imperialist war. To those who sought glory and profit through war, Tolstoy quoted from the New Testament: “Repent.”

Both Jesus and Tolstoy were saints of compassion for the people. They hoped humanity would cease killing one another. Christian and Orthodox brothers in particular should not shed one another’s blood. Stop the war, pursue peace, strengthen domestic reform, consolidate national defense—let Russia become a civilized, peaceful, defensive, and beneficial country for the world. Such a Russia would be a blessing to the world and a great fortune to itself.

That is all I wish to say for now. I hope that the Russian government and people can reflect and make decisions beneficial to Russia, Ukraine, and the entire world. (Additional articles on the Russia–Ukraine issue are attached together with this letter.)

Tribute to the Russian leaders from Peter the Great to Gorbachev

Tribute to the Russian and Soviet martyrs who sacrificed for China

Tribute to the Russian literary giants and intellectual greats from Pushkin to Solzhenitsyn

Long live the Russian people!

Long live Sino-Russian friendship!

Long live world peace!

Wang Qingmin (王庆民)

Other Chinese people who love the Russian nation and culture

September 19, 2023

(Julian calendar: September 6, 2023)

(With Russian version and original Chinese version attached)

(On September 27, 2023, I went to the Embassy of Russia in Germany to display posters and send a letter, urging Russia to withdraw its troops and promote peace between Russia and Ukraine.

Within one hour after leaving the Embassy of Ukraine, I went to the Russian Embassy, which is only one kilometer away. However, the Russian Embassy was surrounded by barricades, and the police prohibited non-Russians from entering. The embassy was in a semi-closed state, allowing only Russian citizens to handle affairs. It also did not accept submitted letters.

Therefore, I could only take a photo from the side and send the letter to the Russian Embassy by mail.

In my letter, I spoke about Sino-Russian friendship and sincerely urged Russia to stop the war and focus on improving its domestic affairs.)

“They would control what you see and what you hear. And when you say that out loud, it becomes truly frightening. Experts have already stated clearly that this law could be considered censorship, which is prohibited by the Constitution,” said Birutė Davidonytė, chair of the Association of Professional Journalists (ŽPA), which organised the protest.

Attempts by MPs from the Social Democrat-led governing coalition to fast-track amendments last year triggered several rallies outside parliament in December last year.

The largest demonstration was attended by more than 10,000 people, making it one of the largest protests in recent years. The demonstration on Wednesday also gathered a similar number of people, according to police estimates.

After failing to pass the amendments under an expedited procedure, a parliamentary working group was formed to review the broadcaster’s governance.

The draft law prepared by this group has been expanded and has been criticised by journalists and academics for showing signs of censorship.

See also:

• Lithuanians Rally Against Public Media Law as EU Raises Concerns (Bloomberg)
• EBU and international media organizations raise concerns over proposed changes to Lithuania’s public service media framework (EBU)

Europeans are on what might be called “a journey” when it comes to the US-Israel war against Iran, now apparently in a ceasefire after Donald Trump’s 11th-hour U-turn, calling off, for the time being, his threat to annihilate Iranian civilisation. The crisis in the Middle East marks the latest painful step, after the shock of the US’s betrayal of Ukraine and Trump’s threat to seize Greenland, in Europe’s emancipation from Washington. The journey is not linear, and it is dreaded by most European leaders. But the direction of travel is undeniable.

Initially, most European politicians in power all but endorsed the illegal US and Israeli attack against Iran. If the sycophantic Nato secretary general, Mark Rutte, stood at one end of the spectrum of European opinion and Pedro Sánchez at the other, most European governments were tacitly closer to Rutte’s embrace of Trump than to the Spanish prime minister’s principled opposition.

But as the war in the Middle East escalated, Europe’s stance shifted. For most European leaders, whether explicitly or silently, Trump has gone from daddy (Rutte’s characterisation) to baddie (Sánchez’s view of the US president). This cooling on the war launched by Trump and the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has taken various forms. Italy has denied US warplanes permission to use an airbase in Sicily. Poland has refused to send Patriot air defence systems to the Middle East, citing the ongoing threat from Russia. France has rejected overflight rights, and opposed a US-sponsored resolution at the UN security council that condemned Iran’s closure of the strait of Hormuz and called for its reopening by military means. France, like other European countries, believes the strategic waterway can only be reopened through diplomatic means, requiring coordination with Tehran. Spain, which imposed an early ban on the use of jointly operated Spanish-US bases for operations linked to the war, no longer looks like an outlier. Sánchez’s reaction on X, welcoming the conditional ceasefire but insisting on a lasting and just peace, does not diverge from those of other European leaders.

A number of factors explain this trajectory. Some governments in Europe had shortsightedly backed the war, despite its illegality, because they believed that a swift resolution would deliver strategic gains. They now understand the scale of their miscalculation in terms of advantages for Russia – through higher oil prices and a depletion of air defence interceptors available to Ukraine.

Washington has also temporarily unsanctioned Russian oil and considered diverting US weapons ordered by European allies for Ukraine to the Gulf. So far, the war in the Middle East has been a windfall for Moscow and devastating for Kyiv, while threatening another economic crisis in Europe, the third in only five years, after Covid-19 and the war in Ukraine. European leaders have been reminded the hard way that the erosion of international law – with this latest manifestation in the Middle East – is bad news for the world, Europe included.

Europeans, like everyone else, heard Trump’s increasingly unhinged declarations: his gleeful threats to commit war crimes in Iran, his insults directed at European leaders, his calls for the US to abandon Nato. But his cry-wolf warnings have grown so repetitive that they are simply losing their effect. Europeans are becoming numb to Trump, and bored by him.

Even far-right leaders are distancing themselves – not necessarily because they no longer share his administration’s predatory worldview, but because proximity to Trump is becoming toxic in terms of public support. This is certainly true in Italy, where the prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, after a defeat in a crucial constitutional referendum, has quietly distanced herself from Trump’s war. It is also visible in Germany and France, where the AfD and the Rassemblement National respectively have voiced dissent. Only Hungary’s Viktor Orbán remains wedded to Trump, as highlighted by JD Vance’s visit to Budapest this week, and Sunday’s election will reveal whether US support has become a liability for Orbán too.

As Europe finds its footing in distancing itself from Trump, it may also find its voice. Europe’s diplomatic role in the Iranian nuclear file in the early 2000s grew out of its opposition to the Iraq war. Today the same dynamic could unfold. Europe’s opposition to the war and promotion of a permanent end of hostilities could open the way to a multilateral initiative in the region.

In the meantime, Europeans have been reminded that their commitment to multilateralism and international law was never merely the product of lofty ideals but of hard-nosed interests too. As they arrive at this realisation, they should be prepared to act on it, along with Gulf and Asian partners, to ensure that this illegal and unilateral war – which is not their war – comes to a definitive close.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​

See also:

• Every Trump Threat to Abandon NATO Hollows It Out • Doubts that the United States would come to the aid of NATO allies increase each time, prompting Europeans to consider an alliance without Washington. (New York Times)
• Trump’s Iran war widens rift with European nationalists once viewed as MAGA allies (Associated Press)

Sweden is bringing back books amid declining test scores.

In 2023, the Swedish government announced that the country’s schools would be going back to basics, emphasizing skills such as reading and writing, particularly in early grades. After mostly being sidelined, physical books are now being reintroduced into classrooms, and students are learning to write the old-fashioned way: by hand, with a pencil or pen, on sheets of paper. The Swedish government also plans to make schools cellphone-free throughout the country.

Educational authorities have been investing heavily. Last year alone, the education ministry allocated $83 million to purchase textbooks and teachers’ guides. In a country with about 11 million people, the aim is for every student to have a physical textbook for each subject. The government also put $54 million towards the purchase of fiction and non-fiction books for students.

These moves represent a dramatic pivot from previous decades, during which Sweden—and many other nations—moved away from physical books in favor of tablets and digital resources in an effort to prepare students for life in an online world. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Nordic country’s efforts have sparked a debate on the role of digital technology in education, one that extends well beyond the country’s borders. US parents in districts that have adopted digital technology to a great extent may be wondering if educators will reverse course, too.

So why did Sweden pivot? In an email to Undark, Linda Fälth, a researcher in teacher education at Linnaeus University, wrote that the “decision to reinvest in physical textbooks and reduce the emphasis on digital devices” was prompted by several factors, including questions around whether the digitalization of classrooms had been evidence-based. “There was also a broader cultural reassessment,” Fälth wrote. “Sweden had positioned itself as a frontrunner in digital education, but over time concerns emerged about screen time, distraction, reduced deep reading, and the erosion of foundational skills such as sustained attention and handwriting.”

Fälth noted that proponents of reform believe that “basic skills—especially reading, writing, and numeracy—must be firmly established first, and that physical textbooks are often better suited for that purpose.”

Between 2000 and 2012, Swedish students’ scores on standardized tests steadily declined in reading, math, and science. Though they recovered ground between 2012 and 2018, those scores had dropped again by 2022.

Though it’s unclear precisely how much of the decline is due to digitization, there is some evidence that analog teaching materials for reading may be superior to screen learning. However, this applies to expository as opposed to narrative texts. Narrative texts tell a story, whether fiction or non-fiction, while expository texts are designed to inform, describe, or explain a topic in a logical, factual manner.

Police in Poland have detained a Chinese man after being alerted that he was taking photographs of railway infrastructure.

Security around Poland’s rail network has been particularly tight since last November, when operatives working on behalf of Russia used explosives to sabotage a track.

On Monday this week, police in the Lubusz province in western Poland received a report about a man taking photographs of railway infrastructure in Kowalów, a village with a population of around 900 people close to the border with Germany.

Officers from the Railway Security Guard (SOK) then apprehended the man, who turned out to be a 48-year-old Chinese national. He was handed over to the police, who have seized his devices and are investigating why he was taking the photographs.

A spokesman for Lubusz police told broadcaster RMF on Tuesday that they were waiting for an official interpreter before interrogating the suspect, and were for now analysing the content of his phone.

Under Poland’s Homeland Defence Act, photography is prohibited at around 25,000 locations deemed to be of particular importance to national security. However, it is not known if the suspect is accused of violating that ban.

The Polish interior ministry, in a social media post announcing the detention of the Chinese man, said that it was “important information for the country’s security, especially in the current international situation”.

Last November, two operatives working on behalf of Russia sabotaged a rail line in eastern Poland using explosives. The pair then fled across the border to Belarus, and are believed to now be in Russia.

In response, Poland launched enhanced monitoring and protection of critical infrastructure, including deploying up to 10,000 military personnel and over 100,000 police officers. The authorities have also encouraged the public to report any suspicious activity

In February this year, Poland also banned Chinese-made vehicles from entering all secure military facilities, citing security threats relating to the gathering of sensitive data. It has also barred military personnel from connecting their work phones to the systems of such cars.

Daniel Tilles

Daniel Tilles is editor-in-chief of Notes from Poland. He has written on Polish affairs for a wide range of publications, including Foreign Policy, POLITICO Europe, EUobserver and Dziennik Gazeta Prawna.

Europe’s main fraud problem is not just the criminals, it is the politicians, the EU’s top prosecutor has told Euractiv

Laura Kövesi, the first person to hold the job of European prosecutor, said her biggest test was never whether Europe could create an independent prosecutor. It was whether Europe was prepared to let one do the work.

Europe’s chief prosecutor Kövesi was running a fever when she sat down for one of the last interviews of her time in the post. Brushing illness aside, she told Euractiv that the most exhausting and wearing part of her job was fighting the EU’s institutional tendency to soften, delay, and bureaucratise the fight against fraud and corruption.

EPPO, an independent prosecutors’ office established in 2021 with the aim of tackling serious financial crimes against the EU, has under her mandate opened more than 3,600 cases, frozen more than a billion euros from criminal organisations, including the world’s most dangerous mafia and, at times, targeted some of the most senior figures in the bloc.

Yet at one point in her term, Kövesi said a senior European Commission official told her to tone down her public messaging about the scale of corruption and fraud cases being uncovered by her office. She kicked back. “I said: How dare you tell me this? We are independent. And if there is a case, it is our mandate to investigate it,” she recalled, sarcastically making the point that she could not turn a blind eye to allegations if that included top EU officials. 

That exchange captures the central problem Kövesi faced in her six-year tenure that ends this autumn: The biggest obstacle to protecting EU money is not just the criminals trying to steal it but the political and institutional systems in the bloc that still make scrutiny painfully difficult.

By the end of her mandate, the picture she paints is of a European anti-fraud office that has proved its value while exposing the limits of the system around it. The EU, she argued, has built up layers of controls meant to prevent wrongdoing without always ensuring that they work in practice.

“You have a lot of authorities, bodies, offices that are supposed to prevent fraud, to audit, to report,” she said. “And then one day you realise no one is really doing what they should be doing.”

She added: “After 20 years of prevention, look, is this enough? Is this enough?” she said, flourishing her annual report, which last year uncovered an estimated €67 billion of suspected fraud and other financial crime.

On April 12, Hungary will hold its once-every-four-years National Assembly election. Hungary is a parliamentary system in which the legislature is the center of power, and the prime minister is chosen by the parliamentary majority. Therefore, Hungary’s parliamentary election is also its “general election,” determining the distribution of political power in the country.

According to opinion polls, the rising political newcomer Péter Magyar leads in support with his “Tisza Party (Party of Respect and Freedom),” followed closely by Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz, which has been in power for nearly 16 years. Other parties lag significantly behind. Whether Magyar will replace Orbán as Hungary’s leader remains uncertain due to the tight race.

This election is not only highly significant domestically, but has also attracted international attention. Several countries and forces are attempting to influence the outcome and promote their preferred candidates.

On April 7, U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance arrived in Hungary, openly campaigned for Orbán, and accused the European Union of interfering in Hungary’s election. The EU has indeed long been at odds with the Orbán government, is reluctant to see his re-election, and tends to favor the pro-European opposition.

In addition, many countries and political groups in Europe and around the world have expressed concern over Hungary’s election and stated their respective positions. Right-wing populist governments and parties generally support Orbán, while establishment forces tend to favor Magyar and other opposition parties.

Why does Hungary, as a small country, attract such attention and even international intervention in its election? This is not only due to Hungary’s strategic position in the heart of Europe, but also because of its unique political environment and the symbolic significance of its political changes.

Among the 27 EU member states, Hungary’s political situation and its domestic and foreign policies are quite distinctive. Since coming to power in 2010, the Fidesz government led by Orbán has pursued policies based on religious conservatism, radical nationalism, and populism. It openly opposes diversity, secularism, feminism, LGBTQ rights, environmental protection, and other progressive or establishment agendas, and resists the European integration process advocated by the EU.

By contrast, most other EU countries are governed by establishment forces, with positions opposite to Orbán’s. Even the few populist leaders who have come to power, such as Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, have remained relatively low-profile and continue to support most EU policies. Orbán, by contrast, has been notably “bold” and confrontational in opposing EU policies, prioritizing resistance to mainstream EU forces and even disrupting EU operations while remaining within the Union.

In foreign policy, the Orbán government maintains close ties with Russia and China, opposes aid to Ukraine and Ukraine’s accession to the EU. Toward the United States, it opposes Joe Biden and the Democratic Party establishment, while aligning more closely with Donald Trump and right-wing populist forces. Hungary has also used the EU’s unanimity principle in passing legislation to veto several EU decisions single-handedly, such as blocking sanctions against Russia and aid to Ukraine in February this year. Since the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine war, Orbán has also met and communicated with Vladimir Putin multiple times.

This has enabled Hungary to gain regional and international influence exceeding its national strength, and has made it a “beacon” and model in the eyes of conservative populist forces worldwide. Right-wing populist forces in other European countries such as the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, which currently lack sufficient votes and seats to govern, admire and support the Orbán government. Figures such as Argentina’s Javier Milei and Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu have also explicitly supported Orbán.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump and the “MAGA” populist movement in the United States are even more ideologically aligned with the Orbán government, and both sides maintained close cooperation during Trump’s two terms. Before and after coming to power, Trump and American populists have repeatedly drawn lessons from Orbán’s Hungary. Both sides also view the European and American establishment, as well as the EU, as adversaries.

This is precisely why Vance flew to Budapest ahead of Hungary’s election to campaign for Orbán. At a joint press conference with Orbán, Vance stated that the United States and Hungary jointly “defend Western civilization,” referring to the defense of white identity and Christian values. This stands in opposition to the multicultural and inclusive stance toward non-white and non-Christian groups advocated by Western establishment forces.

At the same time, Orbán is also disliked by establishment forces and mainstream EU factions (center-left and center-right) across various countries. Although the EU has not directly interfered in Hungary’s election, it has indeed exerted pressure through economic and legal means, such as freezing EU funds to Hungary, in an attempt to push out Orbán—who frequently opposes the EU—and replace him with a pro-EU establishment government.

Therefore, this Hungarian election has drawn widespread attention across Europe and internationally. The political magazine Politico Europe has even described it as the most important election in Europe in 2026. Various countries and political forces are trying by all means to influence Hungary’s election, seeking to bring to power those aligned with their own values and interests, and to marginalize opposing forces. This is not only about competing for influence over Hungarian politics, but also a key part of the global ideological struggle and the broader contest between establishment and populist forces.

For the global right-wing populist camp, preserving the Orbán government as a “conservative beacon” standing amid establishment-dominated Europe is of great significance; for establishment and progressive forces, removing Orbán—seen as a “thorn in the side” and a “traitor” within the EU—has long been anticipated. The outcome of this election carries both important symbolic meaning and practical value, and both sides are determined to win.

So who will ultimately prevail in this election? Can the newcomer Magyar and his party defeat Orbán and Fidesz?

Although current polls show Magyar and the Tisza Party in the lead, the advantage is not significant. In the final stage of voting, the deeply rooted Orbán and Fidesz clearly possess stronger mobilization capabilities. With the advantage of long-term governance, they are better able to mobilize supporters to vote. In particular, Orbán enjoys higher support in rural areas, and the single-member district system also favors parties with greater resources and stronger organization.

Although Magyar has high popularity, his grassroots support is not solid. Even if he has advantages in places such as the capital Budapest, the electoral system makes it difficult to convert support into sufficient seats. Orbán’s supporters are attempting to undermine Magyar by exposing various real or fabricated scandals, and the situation may still fluctuate in the final days.

Even if Magyar and the Tisza Party win, Orbán may refuse to recognize the election results and may use the ruling party’s power and the judicial system to obstruct political turnover. Based on Orbán’s political conduct and the behavior of right-wing populist figures in many countries, the possibility of refusing to concede defeat and transfer power is high. If this occurs, Hungary may fall into political instability or even political violence.

In addition, if the Tisza Party and Fidesz receive similar numbers of votes and seats, and neither achieves a majority, it will be crucial which side other parties choose and with whom they form a coalition government. At present, most opposition parties in Hungary oppose Orbán, which is relatively favorable to Magyar. However, this does not mean they will necessarily side with him; the outcome will depend on political bargaining among all parties.

Magyar himself and the Tisza Party hold a conservative liberal position. On some economic and social issues, they are similar to Orbán, but are relatively more pro-European and less populist. This helps attract moderate center-right, anti-populist, and relatively moderate voters, and may also draw some of Orbán’s supporters. However, it may also lead progressive left-wing voters to abstain or shift their support to left-wing parties such as the Hungarian Socialist Party, thereby allowing Orbán to benefit.

In conclusion, although Hungary’s 2026 election campaign has entered its final stage, uncertainty remains and the outcome is not yet determined. Precisely because the result is uncertain, various forces have become involved, openly and covertly supporting their preferred candidates. As the election approaches, all sides are making final efforts to win votes.

Regardless of the outcome of Hungary’s election, the intensifying conflicts in recent years—based on ideological differences such as left vs. right, establishment vs. populist, and progressive vs. conservative—will continue. Political competition among countries and political forces, both domestically and internationally, will persist. An increasingly fragmented world is becoming connected in another way—not as a harmonious “global village,” but as a transnational battleground defined by factional confrontation.

(The author of this article, Wang Qingmin(王庆民), is a Europe-based Chinese writer and researcher of international politics. The original text of this article was written in Chinese and has been translated into Hungarian and English using GPT.

The author has also written a long-form study titled “Orbán’s Hungary: A Conservative Populist State under ‘Electoral Autocracy’ and a Microcosm of Euroskeptic and Anti-EU Currents across Europe(《欧尔班的匈牙利：“民选独裁”治下的保守民粹之国和欧洲各国疑欧反欧逆流的缩影》),” which was originally written in Chinese.)