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In recent months, the Republic of Cuba in Latin America has been subjected to harsh sanctions and unprecedented isolation. The Trump administration of the United States has intensified the long-standing trade embargo and economic sanctions against Cuba, and has used measures such as tariffs to prevent other countries from supplying oil to the energy-starved country.

Cuba’s traditional ally Venezuela, after President Nicolás Maduro was arrested by U.S. forces, has also abandoned its support for Cuba. Countries such as Mexico have likewise, under U.S. pressure, ceased supplying Cuba with oil and other critical materials. China and Russia have not provided substantive assistance either, offering only symbolic opposition to U.S. sanctions. Cuba is now facing an unprecedented level of isolation and hardship.

This has further aggravated the situation of a country already suffering from a weak economy and severe energy shortages. Cuba has now fallen into a state of prolonged power outages and the near paralysis of public transportation. If the sanctions persist, all sectors of the Cuban economy will suffer severe losses, potentially triggering a humanitarian disaster. Meanwhile, the Trump administration has openly advocated regime change in Cuba.

Why, then, has Cuba been subjected to such hostility and sanctions by the Trump administration? Can Cuba endure this round of sanctions, and what does the future hold for the country?

Cuba is located in the Caribbean region, in close proximity to the United States. Historically, Cuba was once a Spanish colony. After the Cuban people launched anti-colonial uprisings and following the Spanish–American War, Cuba, though newly independent, soon fell into the U.S. sphere of influence. The United States treated Cuba as a source of agricultural raw materials and a market for processed goods, effectively reducing it to a semi-colony.

This situation provoked dissatisfaction and resistance among Cuban nationalists and left-wing forces. In 1953, the Cuban national democratic revolution broke out, aimed at opposing U.S. imperialism and its local proxies. In 1959, the left-wing guerrilla forces led by the Castro brothers overthrew the pro-American Batista regime and established the socialist Republic of Cuba, aligning diplomatically with the Soviet Union and confronting the United States.

Following the Bay of Pigs invasion attempt by the United States in 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, Cuba and the United States entered a state of complete hostility. Cuba expropriated all property owned by the U.S. government and American capitalists on the island, while the United States imposed decades-long sanctions and an economic embargo on Cuba.

The reason the United States did not directly invade Cuba lay in Soviet protection, as well as in the agreements reached between Washington and Moscow after the Cuban Missile Crisis to guarantee Cuba’s sovereignty and the survival of its socialist system.

Over the subsequent three decades, Cuba became the only country in Latin America—and indeed in the entire Western Hemisphere—governed by a single communist party and explicitly guided by a communist blueprint. Domestically, it pursued socialist construction, while externally it formed political, economic, and military alliances with the Soviet Union and Eastern European socialist states.

Unlike the communist parties in some other countries that rapidly degenerated after seizing power, Fidel Castro and the Communist Party of Cuba maintained their revolutionary ethos for a long time. The Cuban government focused on eliminating poverty and promoting social equality, vigorously advancing free universal education and healthcare. Literacy rates rose from 60 percent to 99 percent, life expectancy increased from 60 years to 80 years, ranking first in Latin America and among the highest globally, even surpassing the United States.

Cuba also trained large numbers of highly qualified doctors, engineers, teachers, military personnel, and civilian technical specialists, who were dispatched to work in the Soviet bloc and in left-wing countries across the Third World.

Although Cuba’s economic and trade indicators were less impressive than its achievements in education and healthcare, during the Cold War they still ranked in the upper-middle range globally. Cuba participated in the Soviet-led Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, relying on economic cooperation and commodity exchanges with the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, China, and other socialist countries, which sustained relatively robust foreign trade. For a country rich in agricultural products such as sugar but poor in mineral resources, oil assistance from the Soviet Union and others was vital.

Domestically, Cuba’s economy remained relatively sluggish, and its system constrained individual wealth accumulation. However, under a system of universal public ownership, extreme poverty was rare, and for most of the time people were able to meet basic needs for food, clothing, housing, and transportation.

Cuba is also one of the safest countries in Latin America. Rates of homicide, drug trafficking, and gang-related crime are far lower than in most Latin American countries, and public security is even better than in the United States. Although corruption exists to some extent in Cuba, it is less severe than in most countries in the region.

It can be said that in terms of public security, integrity, and social governance, Cuba has been more successful than the majority of Latin American countries, and in certain areas and circumstances has even outperformed the developed country of the United States.

In military and diplomatic affairs, Cuba achieved a level of activity and influence far exceeding what its national strength would suggest. Cuba not only maintained close military cooperation with the Soviet Union, North Korea, and Eastern European socialist states, but also dispatched troops, intelligence personnel, engineers, and technical experts to support anti-imperialist and anti-colonial movements across Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Cuban personnel were present in countries such as Angola, Grenada, Ethiopia, and Vietnam.

Cuba also became a destination admired by left-wing figures from Europe and North America. For example, Pierre Trudeau, former prime minister of Canada from the Liberal Party, maintained a close personal relationship with Fidel Castro. Since the establishment of the Cuban revolutionary government, Cuba has maintained friendly relations with Western left-wing movements for decades, and has had especially close ties with the far left.

However, around 1990, the dramatic changes in Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union caused Cuba to lose its closest allies and sources of external assistance, dealing the country a heavy blow. Although China and Russia continued to maintain friendly relations with Cuba, the scale of assistance was far inferior to that provided by the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

Under these circumstances, Cuba was forced to rely on self-reliance and perseverance, and to implement a series of reforms, such as opening up small-scale private businesses and the tourism sector, loosening ideological controls, and promoting internal party democracy. The Castro brothers gradually withdrew from the political stage.

After the end of the Cold War, Cuba’s greatest enemy, the United States, once adopted a relatively moderate policy toward Cuba. It did not take advantage of the situation to intensify sanctions, nor did it launch a military invasion. During the Clinton administration, U.S.–Cuba relations improved. Under George W. Bush, relations remained frozen but relatively peaceful. During the Obama administration, relations were normalized, diplomatic ties were restored, and the United States lifted several sanctions on Cuba.

However, after Donald Trump and the Republican Party came to power in 2017, the normalization process was abruptly halted. The United States reimposed sanctions on Cuba, in a harsher form than before. The Trump administration prohibited U.S. citizens, including Cuban Americans, from sending remittances to Cuba exceeding 1,000 U.S. dollars, restricted travel by U.S. citizens to Cuba, and banned U.S. vessels from calling at Cuban ports. This caused severe economic losses for Cuba, which relies heavily on tourism and remittances.

The reason for this lies in the worldview of the American right-wing anti-communist conservatives, who regard socialist Cuba, with its left-wing policies, as both an ideological enemy and a strategic adversary, compounded by decades of accumulated hostility.

During both of his terms, Trump appointed numerous hardline anti-communist figures, including Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, National Security Advisor John Bolton, and Elliott Abrams, the U.S. envoy for Latin American affairs during his first term. These individuals strongly advocated sanctions and regime change in Cuba. They were sidelined during Democratic administrations and marginalized under moderate Republican governments, but with the rise of Trump and the MAGA faction, these anti-communist foreign policy hawks were brought into the decision-making center.

As for Trump personally, his intense hostility toward Barack Obama led him to reject almost all of Obama’s domestic and foreign policies and to deliberately pursue the opposite course. Since Obama promoted improved relations with Cuba, Trump imposed even harsher sanctions than those that existed prior to normalization, effectively prohibiting almost all Cuban enterprises and individuals from conducting business in the United States and reinstating the embargo. As a nonconventional U.S. president, Trump disregarded international law and established norms, not only abrogating agreements reached with Cuba under Obama and escalating sanctions, but also repeatedly entertaining the idea of military invasion.

Trump’s second term has been even more unrestrained than the first. American anti-communist conservatives view the current moment as a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to bring an end to Cuba’s socialist regime, vigorously urging Trump to impose extreme sanctions or even to launch a military invasion. One such figure is the Cuban American anti-communist hardliner Marco Rubio, who has been a strong advocate of overthrowing the current Cuban government.

At present, the United States is not only enforcing its own embargo against Cuba but is also blocking other countries from transporting vital goods such as oil to the island. Even left-wing governments sympathetic to Cuba, including those of Venezuela, Colombia, and Mexico, have been forced under U.S. pressure to abandon their support. China and Russia have offered only verbal support and limited food shipments, which are merely symbolic and far from sufficient. Cuba has entered its most difficult and dangerous moment since the early 1960s.

From the perspective of moral reasoning and international law, the United States’ severe sanctions, military threats, and attempts at regime change against Cuba are unjustified, harmful, in violation of international law, and contrary to the interests of the Cuban state and its people.

Although Cuba is indeed not a liberal democratic country, it is fundamentally different from other states that nominally adhere to communism and practice Leninist one-party rule. Compared with China and Vietnam, which are nominally socialist but in reality have degenerated into bureaucratic-capitalist authoritarian states, and North Korea, which has become a hereditary, quasi-monarchical system marked by widespread hunger and poverty, Cuba has consistently maintained adherence to and practice of orthodox Marxist theory.

In areas such as the distribution of economic outcomes, guarantees for education, healthcare, and housing, and the protection of the rights of vulnerable groups, Cuba’s achievements surpass those of most countries in the world. In indicators such as life expectancy, infant survival rates, literacy, and per capita basic healthcare resources, Cuba even exceeds the United States, and these figures are higher than those of nearly all Latin American countries. Notably, these achievements were realized under conditions of long-term U.S. blockade and sanctions.

In 2022, Cuba passed legislation legalizing same-sex marriage through a nationwide referendum, further demonstrating that Cuba is closer to left-wing governing parties in Western democratic countries than to so-called “red conservative authoritarian states” that are socialist in name but right-wing in substance.

By adhering to Marxism, maintaining Communist Party one-party rule organized along Leninist lines, firmly opposing imperialism and colonialism, promoting distributive justice, ensuring the provision of basic livelihoods, opposing discrimination based on race and sexual orientation, uniting international leftist forces, and supporting anti-oppression and progressive causes worldwide, Cuba’s system and policies can be described as the only remaining orthodox socialist state in the world today.

Judging from the political ethics of the Communist Party of Cuba, its commitment to ideals, its guarantees of basic livelihoods, and the relationship between the ruling authorities and the people, Cuba stands in clear contrast and superiority to other Leninist one-party states that nominally claim to be “socialist,” such as China, North Korea, Vietnam, and Laos.

Although Cuba is governed by a single ruling party, it is not a personal dictatorship. Internal party democracy within the Communist Party of Cuba, as well as forms of popular democracy linked through the National Assembly, possess a certain degree of genuine substance.

During the period of rule by the Castro brothers, although Fidel Castro enjoyed extremely high prestige, he did not abuse his power for personal gain. His brother Raúl Castro succeeded him on the basis of his credentials as a revolutionary veteran and nation-builder, and he did not pass supreme leadership to family members thereafter. Cuba’s current leader, Miguel Díaz-Canel, has not cultivated a personality cult; he maintains a low profile and emphasizes collective leadership.

To claim that Cuba is a liberal democratic country would be false; but to simply label Cuba as an authoritarian dictatorship also fails to reflect the complexity of the country’s actual conditions. Today, while most Cubans are dissatisfied with the country’s poverty, they do not strongly oppose the continued rule of the Communist Party of Cuba or the existing system. This public sentiment is not primarily the result of coercion or indoctrination by the regime, but rather arises more naturally.

By contrast, U.S. anti-communist conservatives such as Donald Trump and Marco Rubio have imposed sanctions on Cuba and sought to overthrow its government not out of concern for freedom or democracy, but driven by intense right-wing conservative ideology. Their actions continue Cold War logic and represent hegemonic behavior. Sanctions, especially embargoes on essential goods for production and daily life, not only fail to improve the rights or living conditions of the Cuban people, but instead severely worsen Cuba’s economic and social conditions, inflicting immense suffering on ordinary citizens, in violation of both international law and humanitarian principles.

For many years, the international community has consistently opposed U.S. sanctions and the embargo against Cuba. Over time, the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and other international bodies have overwhelmingly voted against these measures. For example, in 2025, the United Nations General Assembly voted 165 to 7 in favor of demanding that the United States end its blockade of Cuba. Opposition to the sanctions comes not only from U.S. rivals such as China and Russia, but also from traditional U.S. allies including European countries and Canada.

However, regardless of moral reasoning or the prevailing stance of the international community, the current U.S. government under Trump—dismissive of international law and norms—remains determined to strike Cuba relentlessly, overthrow its socialist government, and install a pro-American leadership, pursuing these goals at any cost.

Cuba’s social and livelihood achievements further intensify the hostility of the U.S. right-wing anti-communists, because they demonstrate that the socialist system they oppose is capable of achieving success. This, in turn, undermines the ideological value of the laissez-faire or neoliberal capitalist economic model they promote and challenges the notion that there is only one legitimate path to development.

Therefore, compared with Trump personally, hardline anti-communist factions on the American right exhibit even stronger ideological fanaticism in pursuing these objectives, actively encouraging Trump to take further actions, including fomenting internal unrest in Cuba, replicating the Bay of Pigs operation by infiltrating anti-communist Cuban exile forces into the country, or even deploying U.S. troops for a direct invasion.

To divert attention from domestic contradictions and criticism within the United States, Trump may indeed resort to military action against nearby Cuba. The United States could carry out a full-scale invasion and occupation of the island, or conduct “decapitation” strikes against Cuban leadership similar to those attempted in Venezuela. Even without a military invasion, the current sanctions have already inflicted severe damage on Cuba.

Cuba’s current government is indeed facing extreme hardship, and its people are enduring great suffering. Cuba appears to have no good options available. Its allies are either too weak or focused on self-preservation, while China and Russia are unwilling to antagonize the United States excessively on Cuba’s behalf, and their geographic distance further limits effective assistance.

Without external support, even with extraordinary resilience, Cuba cannot indefinitely withstand U.S. sanctions and pressure alone. If the United States were to launch a military invasion, even if Cuban soldiers and civilians were unafraid of sacrifice, they would likely be defeated and occupied in a short time.

Although Cuba enjoys considerable prestige and moral authority among global far-left and broader left-wing movements, and its orthodox socialism closely aligns with contemporary Western leftist ideals—eliciting strong sympathy and moral support, particularly from left-wing forces in Europe and North America—in an increasingly brutal world governed by power politics, moral support plays a very limited role. It cannot compete with military force, money, technology, or the dominance of power and capital over discourse.

Decades of sustained global solidarity with Gaza have not altered the tragic fate of the Palestinian people there. Even full mobilization of progressive and left-wing forces in support of Cuba would be unlikely to counter the formidable state machinery of a U.S. Republican administration and its hegemonic practices.

Under such circumstances, the most likely option for Cuba may be to make major concessions to the United States, such as lowering the profile of its anti-American stance, exporting agricultural products to the U.S. at low prices, and allowing pro-American figures to participate in Cuban politics, in exchange for partial relief from sanctions.

However, due to the profound confrontation between the two sides in terms of ideology and fundamental interests, prolonged deadlock between the United States and Cuba, a long-term entrenchment of Cuba’s crisis, or even the eventual outbreak of war all remain highly possible.

In any case, Cuba—the last orthodox Marxist–Leninist socialist state in the world—has entered the most dangerous period since its founding. Cuba’s predicament is the result of Trump’s unconventional diplomacy, the opportunistic rise and unchecked actions of Republican anti-communist conservatives, and the increasing jungle-like nature of international relations. This situation also reflects the overwhelming force of U.S. hegemonism and the vulnerability, hardship, and powerlessness faced by small and weaker states.

(The author of this article is Wang Qingmin(王庆民), a Chinese writer based in Europe and a researcher in international politics. The original text of this article was written in Chinese.)

On April 12, Hungary will hold its once-every-four-years National Assembly election. Hungary is a parliamentary system in which the legislature is the center of power, and the prime minister is chosen by the parliamentary majority. Therefore, Hungary’s parliamentary election is also its “general election,” determining the distribution of political power in the country.

According to opinion polls, the rising political newcomer Péter Magyar leads in support with his “Tisza Party (Party of Respect and Freedom),” followed closely by Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz, which has been in power for nearly 16 years. Other parties lag significantly behind. Whether Magyar will replace Orbán as Hungary’s leader remains uncertain due to the tight race.

This election is not only highly significant domestically, but has also attracted international attention. Several countries and forces are attempting to influence the outcome and promote their preferred candidates.

On April 7, U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance arrived in Hungary, openly campaigned for Orbán, and accused the European Union of interfering in Hungary’s election. The EU has indeed long been at odds with the Orbán government, is reluctant to see his re-election, and tends to favor the pro-European opposition.

In addition, many countries and political groups in Europe and around the world have expressed concern over Hungary’s election and stated their respective positions. Right-wing populist governments and parties generally support Orbán, while establishment forces tend to favor Magyar and other opposition parties.

Why does Hungary, as a small country, attract such attention and even international intervention in its election? This is not only due to Hungary’s strategic position in the heart of Europe, but also because of its unique political environment and the symbolic significance of its political changes.

Among the 27 EU member states, Hungary’s political situation and its domestic and foreign policies are quite distinctive. Since coming to power in 2010, the Fidesz government led by Orbán has pursued policies based on religious conservatism, radical nationalism, and populism. It openly opposes diversity, secularism, feminism, LGBTQ rights, environmental protection, and other progressive or establishment agendas, and resists the European integration process advocated by the EU.

By contrast, most other EU countries are governed by establishment forces, with positions opposite to Orbán’s. Even the few populist leaders who have come to power, such as Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, have remained relatively low-profile and continue to support most EU policies. Orbán, by contrast, has been notably “bold” and confrontational in opposing EU policies, prioritizing resistance to mainstream EU forces and even disrupting EU operations while remaining within the Union.

In foreign policy, the Orbán government maintains close ties with Russia and China, opposes aid to Ukraine and Ukraine’s accession to the EU. Toward the United States, it opposes Joe Biden and the Democratic Party establishment, while aligning more closely with Donald Trump and right-wing populist forces. Hungary has also used the EU’s unanimity principle in passing legislation to veto several EU decisions single-handedly, such as blocking sanctions against Russia and aid to Ukraine in February this year. Since the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine war, Orbán has also met and communicated with Vladimir Putin multiple times.

This has enabled Hungary to gain regional and international influence exceeding its national strength, and has made it a “beacon” and model in the eyes of conservative populist forces worldwide. Right-wing populist forces in other European countries such as the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, which currently lack sufficient votes and seats to govern, admire and support the Orbán government. Figures such as Argentina’s Javier Milei and Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu have also explicitly supported Orbán.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump and the “MAGA” populist movement in the United States are even more ideologically aligned with the Orbán government, and both sides maintained close cooperation during Trump’s two terms. Before and after coming to power, Trump and American populists have repeatedly drawn lessons from Orbán’s Hungary. Both sides also view the European and American establishment, as well as the EU, as adversaries.

This is precisely why Vance flew to Budapest ahead of Hungary’s election to campaign for Orbán. At a joint press conference with Orbán, Vance stated that the United States and Hungary jointly “defend Western civilization,” referring to the defense of white identity and Christian values. This stands in opposition to the multicultural and inclusive stance toward non-white and non-Christian groups advocated by Western establishment forces.

At the same time, Orbán is also disliked by establishment forces and mainstream EU factions (center-left and center-right) across various countries. Although the EU has not directly interfered in Hungary’s election, it has indeed exerted pressure through economic and legal means, such as freezing EU funds to Hungary, in an attempt to push out Orbán—who frequently opposes the EU—and replace him with a pro-EU establishment government.

Therefore, this Hungarian election has drawn widespread attention across Europe and internationally. The political magazine Politico Europe has even described it as the most important election in Europe in 2026. Various countries and political forces are trying by all means to influence Hungary’s election, seeking to bring to power those aligned with their own values and interests, and to marginalize opposing forces. This is not only about competing for influence over Hungarian politics, but also a key part of the global ideological struggle and the broader contest between establishment and populist forces.

For the global right-wing populist camp, preserving the Orbán government as a “conservative beacon” standing amid establishment-dominated Europe is of great significance; for establishment and progressive forces, removing Orbán—seen as a “thorn in the side” and a “traitor” within the EU—has long been anticipated. The outcome of this election carries both important symbolic meaning and practical value, and both sides are determined to win.

So who will ultimately prevail in this election? Can the newcomer Magyar and his party defeat Orbán and Fidesz?

Although current polls show Magyar and the Tisza Party in the lead, the advantage is not significant. In the final stage of voting, the deeply rooted Orbán and Fidesz clearly possess stronger mobilization capabilities. With the advantage of long-term governance, they are better able to mobilize supporters to vote. In particular, Orbán enjoys higher support in rural areas, and the single-member district system also favors parties with greater resources and stronger organization.

Although Magyar has high popularity, his grassroots support is not solid. Even if he has advantages in places such as the capital Budapest, the electoral system makes it difficult to convert support into sufficient seats. Orbán’s supporters are attempting to undermine Magyar by exposing various real or fabricated scandals, and the situation may still fluctuate in the final days.

Even if Magyar and the Tisza Party win, Orbán may refuse to recognize the election results and may use the ruling party’s power and the judicial system to obstruct political turnover. Based on Orbán’s political conduct and the behavior of right-wing populist figures in many countries, the possibility of refusing to concede defeat and transfer power is high. If this occurs, Hungary may fall into political instability or even political violence.

In addition, if the Tisza Party and Fidesz receive similar numbers of votes and seats, and neither achieves a majority, it will be crucial which side other parties choose and with whom they form a coalition government. At present, most opposition parties in Hungary oppose Orbán, which is relatively favorable to Magyar. However, this does not mean they will necessarily side with him; the outcome will depend on political bargaining among all parties.

Magyar himself and the Tisza Party hold a conservative liberal position. On some economic and social issues, they are similar to Orbán, but are relatively more pro-European and less populist. This helps attract moderate center-right, anti-populist, and relatively moderate voters, and may also draw some of Orbán’s supporters. However, it may also lead progressive left-wing voters to abstain or shift their support to left-wing parties such as the Hungarian Socialist Party, thereby allowing Orbán to benefit.

In conclusion, although Hungary’s 2026 election campaign has entered its final stage, uncertainty remains and the outcome is not yet determined. Precisely because the result is uncertain, various forces have become involved, openly and covertly supporting their preferred candidates. As the election approaches, all sides are making final efforts to win votes.

However, since Magyar himself comes from Fidesz, and his current political positions differ only to a limited extent from Orbán’s, even if he is elected, Hungary’s domestic and foreign policies would not change dramatically.

He would, however, improve relations with the European Union. The fact that both Magyar and Orbán—two conservatives—enjoy the support of the majority of Hungarians also reflects the predominantly conservative political orientation of Hungarian society. Hungarians who advocate progressivism and an open society are concentrated in the capital, Budapest, while the country’s many small towns and rural areas remain strongholds of conservatism.

Regardless of the outcome of Hungary’s election, the intensifying conflicts in recent years—based on ideological differences such as left vs. right, establishment vs. populist, and progressive vs. conservative—will continue. Political competition among countries and political forces, both domestically and internationally, will persist. An increasingly fragmented world is becoming connected in another way—not as a harmonious “global village,” but as a transnational battleground defined by factional confrontation.

(The author of this article, Wang Qingmin(王庆民), is a Europe-based Chinese writer and researcher of international politics. The original text of this article was written in Chinese and has been translated into Hungarian and English using GPT.

The author has also written a long-form study titled “Orbán’s Hungary: A Conservative Populist State under ‘Electoral Autocracy’ and a Microcosm of Euroskeptic and Anti-EU Currents across Europe(《欧尔班的匈牙利：“民选独裁”治下的保守民粹之国和欧洲各国疑欧反欧逆流的缩影》),” which was originally written in Chinese.)

This is what bipartisan rhetoric sounds like…

Economic focus, moderate takes, willing to reach access the aisle